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Abstract. We apply Benacerraf’s distinction between mathemat-
ical ontology and mathematical practice (or the structures math-
ematicians use in practice) to examine contrasting interpretations
of infinitesimal mathematics of the 17th and 18th century, in the
work of Bos, Ferraro, Laugwitz, and others. We detect Weier-
strass’s ghost behind some of the received historiography on Eu-
ler’s infinitesimal mathematics, as when Ferraro proposes to under-
stand Euler in terms of a Weierstrassian notion of limit and Fraser
declares classical analysis to be a “primary point of reference for
understanding the eighteenth-century theories”. Meanwhile, schol-
ars like Bos and Laugwitz seek to explore Eulerian methodology,
practice, and procedures in a way more faithful to Euler’s own.
Euler’s use of infinite integers and the associated infinite prod-
ucts is analyzed in the context of his infinite product decomposition
for the sine function. Euler’s principle of cancellation is compared
to the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity. The Leib-
nizian law of continuity similarly finds echoes in Euler.
We argue that Ferraro’s assumption that Euler worked with a
classical notion of quantity is symptomatic of a post-Weierstrassian
placement of Euler in the Archimedean track for the development
of analysis, as well as a blurring of the distinction between the dual
tracks noted by Bos. Interpreting Euler in an Archimedean concep-
tual framework obscures important aspects of Euler’s work. Such
a framework is profitably replaced by a syntactically more versa-
tile modern infinitesimal framework that provides better proxies
for his inferential moves.
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law of continuity; law of homogeneity; principle of cancellation;
procedure; standard part principle; ontology; mathematical prac-
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1. Introduction
This text is part of a broader project of re-appraisal of the Leibniz–
Euler–Cauchy tradition in infinitesimal mathematics that Weierstrass
and his followers broke with around 1870.
In the case of Cauchy, our task is made easier by largely traditionalist
scholars G. Schubring and G. Ferraro. Thus, Schubring distanced him-
self from the Boyer–Grabiner line on Cauchy as the one who gave you
the epsilon in the following terms: “I am criticizing historiographical
approaches like that of Judith Grabiner where one sees epsilon-delta
already realized in Cauchy” [Schubring 2016, Section 3]. Ferraro goes
even further and declares: “Cauchy uses infinitesimal neighborhoods
of x in a decisive way. . . Infinitesimals are not thought as a mere fac¸on
de parler, but they are conceived as numbers, though a theory of infin-
itesimal numbers is lacking.” [Ferraro 2008, p. 354] Ferraro’s comment
is remarkable for two reasons:
• it displays a clear grasp of the procedure vs ontology distinction
(see below Section 2.4);
• it is a striking recognition of the bona fide nature of Cauchy’s
infinitesimals that is a clear break with Boyer–Grabiner.
Ferraro’s comment is influenced by Laugwitz’s perceptive analysis of
Cauchy’s sum theorem in [Laugwitz 1987b], a paper cited several times
on Ferraro’s page 354. For further details on Cauchy see the articles
[B laszczyk, Katz & Sherry 2013], [B laszczyk et al. 2016].
In this article, we propose a re-evaluation of Euler’s and, to an extent,
Leibniz’s work in analysis. We will present our argument in four stages
of increasing degree of controversy, so that readers may benefit from
the text even if they don’t agree with all of its conclusions.
(1) We argue that Euler’s procedures in analysis are best proxified
in modern infinitesimal frameworks rather than in the received mod-
ern Archimedean ones, by showing how important aspects of his work
have been underappreciated or even denigrated because inappropri-
ate conceptual frameworks are being applied to interpret his work. To
appreciate properly Euler’s work, one needs to abandon extraneous on-
tological matters such as the continuum being punctiform (i.e., made
out of points) or nonpunctiform, and focus on the procedural issues of
Euler’s actual mathematical practice.
4 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., S.K., T.M., P.R, D.S., D.S., AND S.S.
(2) One underappreciated aspect of Euler’s work in analysis is its
affinity to Leibniz’s. A number of Eulerian procedures are consonant
with those found in Leibniz, such as the law of continuity (govern-
ing the passage from an Archimedean continuum to an infinitesimal-
enriched continuum) and the transcendental law of homogeneity (gov-
erning the passage from an infinitesimal-enriched continuum back to an
Archimedean continuum). This is consistent with the teacher–student
lineage from Leibniz to Johann Bernoulli to Euler.
(3) Leibniz wrote in 1695 that his infinitesimals violate the property
expressed by Euclid’s Definition V.4 (see [Leibniz 1695, p. 288]).1 This
axiom is a variant of what is known today as the Archimedean property.
Thus, Leibnizian infinitesimals violate the Archimedean property when
compared to other quantities.
(4) Our reading is at odds with the syncategorematic interpretation
elaborated in [Ishiguro 1990, Chapter 5], [Arthur 2008], and elsewhere.
Ishiguro, Arthur, and others maintain that Leibniz’s continuum was
Archimedean, and that his infinitesimals do not designate and are log-
ical fictions in the sense of Russell. The leap by Ishiguro (and her fol-
lowers) from infinitesimals being fictions to their being logical fictions is
a non-sequitur analyzed in articles in Erkenntnis [Katz & Sherry 2013]
and in Studia Leibnitiana [Sherry & Katz 2014]. Arthur’s interpreta-
tion was also challenged in [Tho 2012]. The fictions in question are
pure rather than logical, meaning that they do designate insofar as our
symbolism allows us to think about infinitesimals. This is consistent
with interpretations of Leibniz by [Bos 1974] and [Jesseph 2015] (see
Section 3.2 for a discussion of Jesseph’s analysis). Euler similarly works
explicitly with infinite and infinitesimal numbers rather than some kind
of paraphrase thereof in terms of proto-Weierstrassian hidden quanti-
fiers.
In Appendix A, we examine the mathematical details of the Eulerian
procedures in the context of his proof of the infinite product decompo-
sition for the sine function and related results.
In addition to Robinson’s framework, other modern theories of in-
finitesimals are also available as possible frameworks for the interpre-
tation of Euler’s procedures, such as Synthetic Differential Geome-
try [Kock 2006], [Bell 2008] and Internal Set Theory [Nelson 1977],
[Kanovei & Reeken 2004]. See also [Nowik & Katz 2015] as well as
1Actually Leibniz referred to V.5; in some editions of the Elements this Definition
does appear as V.5. Thus, [Euclid 1660] as translated by Barrow in 1660 provides
the following definition in V.V (the notation “V.V” is from Barrow’s translation):
Those numbers are said to have a ratio betwixt them, which being multiplied may
exceed one the other.
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[Kanovei, Katz & Nowik 2016]. Previous studies of the history of infin-
itesimal mathematics include [Katz & Katz 2011], [Borovik & Katz 2012],
[Bair et al. 2013], [Katz, Schaps & Shnider 2013], [Carroll et al. 2013],
[Bascelli et al. 2014], [Kanovei, Katz & Schaps 2015].
2. Historiography
It is a subject of contention among scholars whether science (includ-
ing mathematics) develops continuously or by discontinuous leaps. The
use of paradigm shifts by [Kuhn 1962] is the most famous instance of
the discontinuous approach. The discontinuous case is harder to make
for mathematics than for the physical sciences: we gave up on phlogis-
ton and caloric theory, but we still use the Pythagorean theorem and
l’Hoˆpital’s rule.
2.1. Continuity and discontinuity. We argue that the continuous vs
discontinuous dichotomy is relevant to understanding some of the cur-
rent debates in interpreting classical infinitesimalists like Leibniz and
Euler. Thus, A. Robinson argued for continuity between the Leibnizian
framework and his own, while H. Bos rejected Robinson’s contention
in the following terms:
. . . the most essential part of non-standard analysis,
namely the proof of the existence of the entities it deals
with, was entirely absent in the Leibnizian infinitesimal
analysis, and this constitutes, in my view, so fundamen-
tal a difference between the theories that the Leibnizian
analysis cannot be called an early form, or a precursor,
of non-standard analysis [Bos 1974, p. 83].
Of course, many scholars reject continuity not merely between Robin-
son’s framework and historical infinitesimals, but also between the re-
ceived modern mathematical frameworks and historical infinitesimals.
A case in point is Ferraro’s treatment of an infinitesimal calculation
found in [Euler 1730-1731, pp. 11-12]. Here Euler sought the value of
the ratio
(
1− xg/(f+g))/g for f = 1 and g = 0 by applying l’Hoˆpital’s
rule to 1−x
z
z
. Ferraro proceeds to present the problem “from a modern
perspective” by analyzing the function f(z) = 1−x
z
z
and its behavior
near z = 0 in the following terms:
From the modern perspective, the problem of extending
the function f(z) = 1−x
z
z
in a continuous way means
that. . . the domain D of f(z) has a point of accu-
mulation at 0 so that we can attempt to calculate the
6 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., S.K., T.M., P.R, D.S., D.S., AND S.S.
limit as z → 0, where by λ = limz→c f(z) [the c in Fer-
raro’s formula needs to be replaced by 0] we mean: given
any ε > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that if z belongs toD
and |z| < δ then |f(z) − λ| < ε; . . . This procedure is
substantially meaningless for Euler [Ferraro 2004, p. 46].
(emphasis added)
Ferraro’s concluding remarks concerning “substantially meaningless”
procedures place him in the discontinuity camp.
While there is a great deal of truth in the discontinuous position,
particularly with regard to currently prevalent ontological frameworks
(set-theoretic or category-theoretic), we will argue for a limited reading
of the history of analysis from the perspective of continuous develop-
ment in the following sense. As we analyze the history of analysis
since the 17th century, we note stark differences among the objects
with which mathematicians reason; there are for example no sets as
explicit mathematical objects in Leibniz or Euler. On the other hand,
there are important continuities in the principles which guide the in-
ferences that they draw; for example, Leibniz’s transcendental law of
homogeneity, Euler’s principle of cancellation, and the standard part
principle exploited in analysis over a hyperreal extension R ⊆ ∗R.
The crucial distinction here is between practice and ontology, as we
detail below in Section 2.4. We will argue that there is a historical
continuity in mathematical practice but discontinuity in mathematical
ontology. More specifically, the set-theoretic semantics that currently
holds sway is a discontinuity with respect to the historical evolution of
mathematics. Scholars at times acknowledge the distinction in relation
to their own work, as when Ferraro speaks about the intensional na-
ture of the entities in Euler in [Ferraro 2004, p. 44] and the syntactic
nature of algebraic and analytic operations [Ferraro 2008, p. 203], but
not always when it comes to passing judgment on Laugwitz’s work; see
Section 2.2.
2.2. Procedures and proxies. In the case of Euler, we will exam-
ine philosophical issues of interpretation of infinitesimal mathematics
(more specifically, the use of infinitesimals and infinite integers) and
seek to explore the roots of the current situation in Euler scholarship,
which seems to be something of a dialog of the deaf between competing
approaches. Some aspects of Euler’s work in analysis were formalized in
terms of modern infinitesimal theories by Laugwitz, McKinzie, Tuckey,
and others. Referring to the latter, G. Ferraro claims that “one can
see in operation in their writings a conception of mathematics which
is quite extraneous to that of Euler” [Ferraro 2004, p. 51] (emphasis
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added). Ferraro concludes that “the attempt to specify Euler’s no-
tions by applying modern concepts is only possible if elements are used
which are essentially alien to them, and thus Eulerian mathematics is
transformed into something wholly different.” [Ferraro 2004, pp. 51-52]
(emphasis added)
Now quite extraneous and essentially alien are strong criticisms. The
vagueness of the phrase “to specify Euler’s notions by applying mod-
ern concepts” makes it difficult to evaluate Ferraro’s claim here. If
specification amounts to bringing to light tacit assumptions in Euler’s
reasoning, then it is hard to see why Ferraro uses such harsh language.
We find a different attitude in P. Reeder’s approach to Euler. Reeder
writes:
I aim to reformulate a pair of proofs from [Euler’s] In-
troductio using concepts and techniques from Abraham
Robinson’s celebrated non-standard analysis (NSA). I
will specifically examine Euler’s proof of the Euler for-
mula and his proof of the divergence of the harmonic
series. Both of these results have been proved in subse-
quent centuries using epsilontic (standard epsilon-delta)
arguments. The epsilontic arguments differ significantly
from Euler’s original proofs. [Reeder 2012, p. 6].
Reeder concludes that “NSA possesses the tools to provide appropriate
proxies of the inferential moves found in the Introductio.” Reeder finds
significant similarities between some of Euler’s proofs and proofs in a
hyperreal framework. Such similarities are missing when one compares
Euler’s proofs to proofs in the ǫ, δ tradition. We take this to mean that
Euler’s conception has more in common with the syntactic resources
available in a modern infinitesimal tradition than in the ǫ, δ tradition.
Scholars thus appear to disagree sharply as to the relevance of mod-
ern theories to Euler’s mathematics, and as to the possibility of mean-
ingfully reformulating Euler’s infinitesimal mathematics in terms of
modern theories.
2.3. Precalculus or analysis? Having mentioned Euler’s Introduc-
tio, we would like to clarify a point concerning the nature of this
book. Blanton writes in his introduction that “the work is strictly
pre-calculus” [Euler 1988, p. xii]. Is this an accurate description of the
book? It is worth keeping the following points in mind.
(1) The algebraic nature of the Introductio was mirrored 70 years
later by Cauchy’s Cours d’Analyse, which was subtitled Analyse
8 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., S.K., T.M., P.R, D.S., D.S., AND S.S.
Algebrique. Laugwitz noted in fact that Cours d’Analyse was
modeled on Euler’s Introductio [Laugwitz 1999, p. 52].
(2) There may not be much material related to differentiation in In-
troductio, but series are dealt with extensively. Series certainly
being part of analysis, it seems more reasonable to describe
Introductio as analysis than precalculus.
(3) Infinitesimals in Introductio and differentials in Institutiones
are arguably of similar nature. Leibniz already thought of dif-
ferentials as infinitesimals, as did Johann Bernoulli. There is
little reason to assume otherwise as far as Euler is concerned,
particularly since he viewed all his analysis books as a unified
whole.
To elaborate further on item (3), note that Euler writes in his In-
stitutionum calculi integralis as follows: “In calculo differentiali iam
notavi, quaestionem de differentialibus non absolute sed relative esse
intelligendam, ita ut, si y fuerit function quaecunque ipsius x, non
tam ipsum eius differentiale dy, quam eius ratio ad differentiale dx sit
definienda.” [Euler 1768-1770, p. 6, Scholion 1, § 5] This can be trans-
lated as follows: “Now in differential calculus I have observed that an
investigation of differentiation is to be understood as not absolute but
relative; namely, if y is a function of x, what one needs to define is not
so much its differential dy itself as its ratio to the differential dx.”
The comment indicates that throughout the period 1748-1768, Euler
thinks of infinitesimals and differentials as essentially interchangeable.
2.4. Practice versus ontology. In an influential essay “The Relation
Between Philosophy of Science and History of Science,” M. Wartofsky
argues that historiography of science needs to begin its analysis by map-
ping out an ontology of the scientific field under investigation. Here on-
tology is to be understood in a broader sense than merely the ontology
of the entities exploited in that particular science – such as numbers,
functions, sets, etc., in the case of mathematcs – but rather develop the
ontology of mathematics as a scientific theory itself [Wartofsky 1976,
p. 723].
As a modest step in this direction we distinguish between the (his-
torically relative) ontology of the mathematical objects in a certain
historical setting, and its procedures, particularly emphasizing the dif-
ferent roles these components play in the history of mathematics. More
precisely, our procedures serve as a representative of what Wartofsky
called the praxis characteristic of the mathematics of a certain time
period, and our ontology takes care of the mathematical objects recog-
nized at that time.
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To motivate our adherence to procedural issues, we note that there is
nothing wrong in principle with investigating pure ontology. However,
practically speaking attempts by historians to gain insight into Euler’s
ontology (as opposed to procedures) have a tendency, to borrow Joseph
Brodsky’s comment in his introduction to Andrei Platonov’s novel The
Foundation Pit, to choke on their own subjunctive mode, as richly il-
lustrated by an ontological passage that we quote in section Higher
ontological order (Section 2.8).
The dichotomy of mathematical practice versus ontology of mathe-
matical entities has been discussed by a number of authors including
W. Quine, who wrote: “Arithmetic is, in this sense, all there is to num-
ber: there is no saying absolutely what the numbers are; there is only
arithmetic.” [Quine 1968, p. 198]
For our purposes it will be more convenient to rely on Benacerraf’s
framework. [Benacerraf 1965] pointed out that if observer E learned
that the natural numbers “are” the Zermelo ordinals
∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, . . . ,
while observer J learned that they are the von Neumann ordinals
∅, {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, . . .
then, strictly speaking, they are dealing with different things. Never-
theless, observer E’s actual mathematical practice (and the mathemati-
cal structures he is interested in) is practically the same as observer J’s.
Hence, different ontologies may underwrite one and the same practice.
For observer E, the entity 0 is not an element of the entity 2, while
for observer J it is. But for both of them the relation 0 < 2 holds.
Benacerraf’s point is that although mathematicians carry on their rea-
soning in terms of some objects or others, the particular objects are
not so important as the relations among those objects. The relations
may be the same, even though the objects are different.
We would extend this insight beyond differences in set-theoretic foun-
dations and argue that even though Euler reasons about quantities and
Robinson reasons about sets (or types), they both agree, for example,
that a + dx = a for infinitesimal dx in a suitable generalized sense
of equality. This is made precise in a hyperreal framework via the
standard part principle; see Section 3.3 for more details.
This distinction relativizes the import of ontology in understand-
ing mathematical practice. A year after the publication of Benac-
erraf’s text, a related distinction was made by Robinson in syntac-
tic/procedural terms:
10 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., S.K., T.M., P.R, D.S., D.S., AND S.S.
. . . the theory of this book . . . is presented, naturally,
within the framework of contemporary Mathematics,
and thus appears to affirm the existence of all sorts of
infinitary entities. However, from a formalist point of
view we may look at our theory syntactically and may
consider that what we have done is to introduce new
deductive procedures rather than new mathematical en-
tities. [Robinson 1966, p. 282] (emphasis in the original)
In short, we have, on the one hand, the ontological issue of giving
a foundational account for the entities, such as infinitesimals and infi-
nite integers, that classical infinitesimalists may be working with. On
the other hand, we have their procedures, or inferential moves, termed
syntactic by Robinson. What interests Euler scholars like Laugwitz is
not Euler’s ontology but the syntactic procedures of his mathematical
practice. The contention that B-track formalisations (see Section 2.5)
provide better proxies for Euler’s procedures and inferential moves than
A-track formalisations, is a methodological or instrumentalist rather
than an ontological or foundational matter.
To quote C. Pulte: “Philosophy of science today should offer a more
accurate analysis to history of science without giving up its task – not
always appreciated by historians – to uncover the basic concepts and
methods which seem relevant for the understanding of science in ques-
tion.” [Pulte 2012, p. 184] (emphasis added) Lagrange’s approach in
his 1788 Me´chanique analytique was remarkably modern in its instru-
mentalism:
Neither are the metaphysical premises of his mechanics
made explicit, nor is there any epistemological justifica-
tion given for the presumed infallible character of the
basic principles of mechanics. This is in striking con-
trast not only to 17th-century foundations of mechanics
such as that of Descartes, Leibniz, and Newton but also
to the approaches of Lagrange’s immediate predecessors,
Euler, Maupertuis, or d’Alembert . . . In short, a cen-
tury after Newton’s Principia, Lagrange’s textbook can
be seen as an attempt to update the mathematical prin-
ciples of natural philosophy while abandoning the tra-
ditional subjects of philosophia naturalis. In this special
sense, the Me´chanique analitique [sic] is also a striking
example of mathematical instrumentalism. [Pulte 1998,
p. 158] (emphasis in the original)
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Two and a quarter centuries after Lagrange’s instrumentalist approach,
perhaps a case can be made in favor of a historiography focusing on
methodological issues accompanied by an instrumentalist caution con-
cerning metaphysics and/or ontology of mathematical entities like num-
bers and quantities. This is in line with Pulte’s insightful comment
made in the context of the study of rational mechanics in the 18th cen-
tury: “Euclideanism continues to be the ideal of science, but it becomes
a syntactical rather than a semantical concept of science.” [Pulte 2012,
p. 192]
2.5. A-track and B-track from Klein to Bos. The sentiment that
there have been historically at least two possible approaches to the
foundations of analysis, involving dual methodology, has been expressed
by a number of authors.
In 1908, Felix Klein described a rivalry of two types of continua in
the following terms. Having outlined the developments in real analysis
associated with Weierstrass and his followers, Klein pointed out that
“The scientific mathematics of today is built upon the series of devel-
opments which we have been outlining. But an essentially different
conception of infinitesimal calculus has been running parallel with this
[conception] through the centuries” [Klein 1908, p. 214]. Such a differ-
ent conception, according to Klein, “harks back to old metaphysical
speculations concerning the structure of the continuum according to
which this was made up of . . . infinitely small parts” (ibid.). Thus
according to Klein there is not one but two separate tracks for the
development of analysis:
(A) the Weierstrassian approach (in the context of an Archimedean
continuum); and
(B) the approach with indivisibles and/or infinitesimals (in the con-
text of what could be called a Bernoullian continuum).
For additional details on Klein see Section 4.3.
A similar distinction can be found in Henk Bos’s seminal 1974 study
of Leibnizian methodology. Here Bos argued that distinct methodolo-
gies, based respectively on (Archimedean) exhaustion and on infinitesi-
mals, are found in the work of 17th and 18th century giants like Leibniz
and Euler:
Leibniz considered two different approaches to the foun-
dations of the calculus; one connected with the classical
methods of proof by “exhaustion”, the other in con-
nection with a law of continuity [Bos 1974, section 4.2,
p. 55].
12 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., S.K., T.M., P.R, D.S., D.S., AND S.S.
The first approach mentioned by Bos relies on an “exhaustion” method-
ology in the context of an Archimedean continuum. Exhaustion method-
ology is based on proofs by reductio ad absurdum and the ancient the-
ory of proportion, which, as is generally thought today, is based on the
Archimedean axiom.2
One way of formulating the axiom is to require that every positive
number can be added to itself finitely many times to obtain a number
greater than one. The adjective Archimedean in this sense was intro-
duced by O. Stolz in the 1880s (see Section 3.9). We will refer to this
type of methodology as the A-methodology.
Concerning the second methodology Bos notes: “According to Leib-
niz, the use of infinitesimals belongs to this kind of argument” [Bos 1974,
p. 57]. We will refer to it as the B-methodology, in an allusion to Jo-
hann Bernoulli (whose work formed the basis for [l’Hoˆpital 1696]), who,
having learned an infinitesimal methodology from Leibniz, never wa-
vered from it.
The Leibnizian laws such as the law of continuity mentioned by Bos
in the passage cited above, as well as the transcendental law of homo-
geneity mentioned in [Bos 1974, p. 33], find close procedural analogs in
Euler’s work, and indeed in Robinson’s framework. The transcendental
law of homogeneity is discussed in Section 3.3 and the law of continuity
in Section 3.6.
In 2004, Ferraro appeared to disagree with Bos’s dual track assess-
ment, and argued for what he termed a “continuous leap” between
(A-track) limits and (B-track) infinitesimals in Euler’s work; see Sec-
tion 4.10.
2We note, in the context of Leibniz’s reference to Archimedes, that there are other
possible interpretations of the exhaustion method of Archimedes. The received in-
terpretation, developed in [Dijksterhuis 1987], is in terms of the limit concept of
real analysis. However, [Wallis 1685, pp. 280-290] developed a different interpreta-
tion in terms of approximation by infinite-sided polygons. The ancient exhaustion
method has two components:
(1) geometric construction, consisting of approximation by some simple figure,
e.g., a polygon or a line built of segments,
(2) justification carried out in the theory of proportion as developed in Ele-
ments Book V.
In the 17th century, mathematicians adopted the first component, and developed
alternative justifications. The key feature is the method of exhaustion is the logical
structure of its proof, namely reductio ad absurdum, rather than the nature of the
background continuum. The latter can be Bernoullian, as Wallis’ interpretation
shows.
INTERPRETING LEIBNIZ AND EULER 13
2.6. Mancosu and Hacking. To support our contention that there
exist two distinct viable tracks for the development of analysis, we call
attention to Mancosu’s critique of Go¨del’s heuristic argument for the
inevitability of the Cantorian cardinalities as the only plausible theory
of the infinite. Go¨del’s argued that
the number of objects belonging to some class does not
change if, leaving the objects the same, one changes
in any way whatsoever their properties or mutual re-
lations (e.g. their colors or their distribution in space).
[Go¨del 1990, p. 254]
Mancosu argues that recent theories on numerosities undermine Go¨del’s
assumption. These were developed in [Benci & Di Nasso 2003] as well
as [Di Nasso & Forti 2010] and elsewhere.3 Mancosu concludes that
having a different way of counting infinite sets shows
that while Go¨del gives voice to one plausible intuition
about how to generalize ‘number’ to infinite sets there
are coherent alternatives. [Mancosu 2009, p. 638].
Inspired in part by [Mancosu 2009], Ian Hacking proposes a distinction
between the butterfly model and the Latin model, namely the contrast
between a model of a deterministic biological development of animals
like butterflies, as opposed to a model of a contingent historical evo-
lution of languages like Latin. For a further discussion of Hacking’s
views see Section 5 below.
2.7. Present-day standards. Bos’s comment on Robinson cited at
the beginning of Section 2.1 is not sufficiently sensitive to the dichotomy
of practice (or procedures) versus ontology (or foundational account for
the entities) as analyzed in Section 2.4. Leibnizian procedures exploit-
ing infinitesimals find suitable proxies in the procedures in the hyper-
real framework; see [Reeder 2013] for a related discussion in the context
3A technical comment on numerosities is in order. A numerosity is a finitely ad-
ditive measure-like function defined on an algebra of sets, which takes values in
the positive half of a non-Archimedean ordered ring. A numerosity is elementary
if and only if it assigns the value 1 to every singleton in the domain, so that the
numerosity of any finite set is then equal to its number of elements. Therefore
any elementary numerosity can be viewed as a generalization of the notion of finite
quantity. Numerosities are sometimes useful in studies related to Lebesgue-like and
similar measures, where they help to “individualize” classically infinite measure
values, associating them with concrete infinitely large elements of a chosen non-
Archimedean ordered ring or field. As a concept of infinite quantity, numerosities
have totally different properties, as well as a totally different field of applications,
than the Cantorian cardinals.
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of Euler. The relevance of such hyperreal proxies is in no way dimin-
ished by the fact that set-theoretic foundations of the latter (“proof
of the existence of the entities,” as Bos put it) were obviously as un-
available in the 17th century as set-theoretic foundations of the real
numbers.
In the context of his discussion of “present-day standards of mathe-
matical rigor”, Bos writes:
it is understandable that for mathematicians who be-
lieve that these present-day standards are final, nonstan-
dard analysis answers positively the question whether,
after all, Leibniz was right [Bos 1974, p. 82, item 7.3].
(emphasis added)
The context of the discussion makes it clear that Bos’s criticism tar-
gets Robinson. If so, Bos’s criticism suffers from a strawman fallacy,
for Robinson specifically wrote that he did not consider set theory to
be the foundation of mathematics. Being a formalist, Robinson did
not subscribe to the view attributed to him by Bos that “present-day
standards are final.” Robinson expressed his position on the status
of set theory as follows: “an infinitary framework such as set theory
. . . cannot be regarded as the ultimate foundation for mathematics”
[Robinson 1969, p. 45]; see also [Robinson 1966, p. 281]. Furthermore,
contrary to Bos’s claim, Robinson’s goal should not be seen as show-
ing that “Leibniz was right” (see above). Rather, Robinson’s goal was
to provide hyperreal proxies for the inferential procedures commonly
found in Leibniz as well as Euler and Cauchy. Leibniz’s procedures,
involving as they do infinitesimals and infinite numbers, seem far less
puzzling when compared to their B-track hyperreal proxies than from
the viewpoint of the traditional A-track frameworks; see Section 2.5.
2.8. Higher ontological order. We wish to emphasize that we do
not hold that it is only possible to interpret Euler in terms of mod-
ern formalisations of his procedures. Discussions of Eulerian ontology
could potentially be fruitful. Yet some of the existing literature in this
direction tends to fall short of a standard of complete lucidity. Thus,
M. Panza quotes Euler to the effect that “Just as from the ideas of indi-
viduals the idea of species and genus are formed, so a variable quantity
is the genus in which are contained all determined quantities,” and
proceeds to explicate this as follows:
As constant quantities are determined quantities, this
is the same as claiming that a variable quantity is the
genus in which are contained all constant quantities. A
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variable quantity is thus a sort of a formal character-
ization of quantity as such. Its concept responds to a
need for generality, i.e. a need of studying the essential
properties of any object of a certain genus, the proper-
ties that this object has insofar as it belongs to such a
genus. But, according to Euler, this study has to have
its own objects. In order to identify these objects, it
is necessary to sever these essential properties from any
other property that characterizes any object falling un-
der the same genus. If the genus is that of quantities,
one has thus to identify some objects that are not spe-
cific (and, a fortiori, particular) quantities and pertain
thus to a higher ontological order than that to which
specific quantities pertain. [Panza 2007, pp. 8-9] (em-
phasis added).
We are somewhat confused by this passage which seems to be onto-
logical in nature. Since ontology is not our primary concern here (see
Section 2.4), we will merely propose further investigation into the na-
ture of variable quantities.
3. Our reading of Leibniz and Euler
The book Introductio in Analysin Infinitorum [Euler 1748] contains
remarkable calculations carried out in a framework where the basic
algebraic operations are applied to infinitely small and infinitely large
quantities.
3.1. Exponential function. In Chapter 7 on exponentials and loga-
rithms expressed through series, we find a derivation of the power series
for the exponential function az starting from the formula
aω = 1 + kω. (3.1)
Here ω is infinitely small, while k is finite. Euler specifically describes
the infinitesimal ω as being nonzero; see Section 4.8. Euler then raises
equation (3.1) to the infinitely great power i = z
ω
for a finite z to give
az = aiω = (1 + kω)i. (3.2)
He then expands the right hand side of (3.2) into a power series by
means of the binomial formula. In the chapters that follow, Euler
finds infinite product decompositions for transcendental functions (see
Section 3.5 below where we analyze his infinite product formula for
sine). In this section, we argue that the underlying principles of Euler’s
mathematics are closer to Leibniz’s than is generally recognized.
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3.2. Useful fictions. We argue in this subsection that Euler follows
Leibniz both ontologically and methodologically. On the one hand,
Euler embraces infinities as well-founded fictions; on the other, he dis-
tinguishes assignable quantities from inassignable quantities.
The nature of infinitesimal and infinitely large quantities is dealt
with in Chapter 3 of Institutiones Calculi Differentialis [Euler 1755].
We cite Blanton’s English translation of the Latin original:
[e]ven if someone denies that infinite numbers really ex-
ist in this world, still in mathematical speculations there
arise questions to which answers cannot be given unless
we admit an infinite number.4 [Euler 2000, § 82]
Here Euler argues that infinite numbers are necessary “in mathemati-
cal speculations” even if someone were to deny “their existence in this
world”. Does this passage indicate that Euler countenances the pos-
sibility of denying that “infinite numbers really exist in this world”?
His position can be fruitfully compared with that of the scholars of
the preceding generation. Indeed, the scholars of the preceding gener-
ation disagreed on the issue of the existence of infinitesimal quantities.
Bernoulli, l’Hoˆpital, and Varignon staunchly adhered to the existence of
infinitesimals, while Leibniz adopted a more nuanced stance. Leibniz’s
correspondence emphasized two aspects of infinitesimal and infinite
quantities: they are
(1) useful fictions and
(2) inassignable quantities.
It is important to clarify the meaning of the Leibnizian term fic-
tion. Infinitesimals are to be understood as pure fictions rather than
logical fictions, as discussed in Section 1; see [Katz & Sherry 2012],
[Katz & Sherry 2013], and [Sherry & Katz 2014]. Furthermore, the
work [Jesseph 2015] shows that Leibniz’s strategy for paraphrasing
B-methods in terms of A-methods has to presume the correctness
of an infinitesimal inference (more precisely, an inference exploiting
infinitesimals), namely identifying the tangent to a curve. In the
case of conic sections this succeeds because the tangents are already
known from Apollonius. But for general curves, and in particular for
4In the original Latin this reads as follows: “Verum ut ad propositum revertamus,
etiamsi quis neget in mundo numerum infinitum revera existere; tamen in spec-
ulationibus mathematicis saepissime occurrunt questiones, ad quas, nisi numerus
infinitus admittatur, responderi non posset.” Note that the Latin uses the sub-
junctive neget (rather than negat), which is the mode used for a “future less vivid”
condition: not “even if someone denies” but rather “even if someone were to deny.”
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transcendental curves treated by Leibniz,5 non-Archimedean infinitesi-
mals remain an irreducible part of the Leibnizian framework, contrary
to [Ishiguro 1990, Chapter 5]. This argument is developed in more
detail in [Bascelli et al. 2016].
Similarly to Leibniz, Euler exploited the dichotomy of assignable
vs inassignable, and mentioned the definition of infinitesimals as be-
ing smaller than every assignable quantity, as well as the definition
of infinite numbers as being greater than every assignable quantity;
see [Gordon, Kusraev & Kutateladze 2002, p. 17, 19, 20]. Thus, Euler
writes: “if z becomes a quantity less than any assignable quantity, that
is, infinitely small, then it is necessary that the value of the fraction
1/z becomes greater than any assignable quantity and hence infinite.”
[Euler 2000, § 90].
Euler’s wording in [Euler 2000, § 82], making the usefulness of infinite
numbers independent of their “existence in this world,” suggests that
his position is closer to a Leibnizian view that infinitesimals are useful
(or well-founded) fictions. Euler goes on to note that
an infinitely small quantity is nothing but a vanishing
quantity, and so it is really = 0.6 [Euler 2000, § 83]
Euler’s term nihil is usually translated as nothing by Blanton. How-
ever, in Introductio, § 114, Blanton translates “tantum non nihilo sit
aequalis” as “just not equal to zero” where it should be “just not equal
to nothing” (see Section 4.8). Granted, “equal to nothing” would sound
awkward, but Euler seems to distinguish it from “equal to zero”. It is
tempting to conjecture that nihil might be equivalent to “exactly equal
to zero”, whereas cyphra is the term for a quantity whose only possible
assignable value is zero, or “shadow zero”. Meanwhile in Institutiones
§ 84, Euler writes “duae quaevis cyphrae ita inter se sunt aequales, ut
earum differentia fit nihil.” This can be translated as follows: “two
zeros are equal to each other, so that there is no difference between
them.” This phrase is part of a larger sentence that reads as follows
in translation: “Although two zeros are equal to each other, so that
there is no difference between them, nevertheless, since we have two
ways to compare them, either arithmetic or geometric, let us look at
5Leibniz applies his method in his de Quadratura Arithmetica to find the quadra-
ture of general cycloidal segments [Edwards, C. H., Jr. 1979, p. 251]. Here also the
calculation exploits the family of tangent lines.
6In the original Latin this reads as follows: “Sed quantitas infinite parva nil aliud
est nisi quantitas evanescens, ideoque revera erit = 0.” Note that the equality
sign “=” and the digit “0” are both in the original. While Euler writes “revera
erit = 0” in § 83, in the next § 84 the formulation is “revera esse cyphram.”
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quotients of quantities to be compared in order to see the difference.”
[Euler 2000, p. 51].
This could be interpreted as saying that two instances of cyphra
could be equal arithmetically but not geometrically. The distinction
between cyphra and nihil could potentially give a satisfactory account
for the Eulerian hierarchy of zeros.
3.3. Law of homogeneity from Leibniz to Euler. As analyzed in
Section 3.2, Euler insists that the relation of equality holds between
any infinitesimal and zero. Similarly, Leibniz worked with a gener-
alized relation of “equality” which was an equality up to a negligible
term. Leibniz codified this relation in terms of his transcendental law
of homogeneity (TLH), or lex homogeneorum transcendentalis in the
original Latin [Leibniz 1710]. Leibniz had already referred to the law
of homogeneity in his first work on the calculus: “quantitates differen-
tiales, quae solae supersunt, nempe dx, dy, semper reperiuntur extra
nominatores et vincula, et unumquodque membrum afficitur vel per dx,
vel per dy, servata semper lege homogeneorum quoad has duas quanti-
tates, quomodocunque implicatus sit calculus” [Leibniz 1684] (empha-
sis added). This can be translated as follows: “the only remaining
differential quantities, namely dx, dy, are found always outside the nu-
merators and roots, and each member is acted on by either dx, or by dy,
always with the law of homogeneity maintained with regard to these
two quantities, in whatever manner the calculation may turn out.”
The TLH governs equations involving differentials. Bos interprets it
as follows:
A quantity which is infinitely small with respect to an-
other quantity can be neglected if compared with that
quantity. Thus all terms in an equation except those
of the highest order of infinity, or the lowest order of
infinite smallness, can be discarded. For instance,
a+ dx = a (3.3)
dx+ ddy = dx
etc. The resulting equations satisfy this . . . requirement
of homogeneity [Bos 1974, p. 33]
(here the expression ddx denotes a second-order differential obtained
as a second difference). Thus, formulas like Euler’s
a+ dx = a (3.4)
(where a “is any finite quantity”; [Euler 2000, § § 86,87]) belong in the
Leibnizian tradition of drawing inferences in accordance with the TLH
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and as reported by Bos in formula (3.3) above. The principle of cancel-
lation of infinitesimals was, of course, the very basis of the technique,
as articulated for example in [l’Hoˆpital 1696] (see also Section 4.1).
However, it was also the target of Berkeley’s charge of a logical incon-
sistency [Berkeley 1734]. This can be expressed in modern notation by
the conjunction (dx 6= 0) ∧ (dx = 0). But the Leibnizian framework
does not suffer from an inconsistency of type (dx 6= 0) ∧ (dx = 0)
given the more general relation of “equality up to”; in other words,
the dx is not identical to zero but is merely discarded at the end of the
calculation in accordance with the TLH; see further in Section 4.13.
3.4. Relations (pl.) of equality. What Euler and Leibniz appear to
have realized more clearly than their contemporaries is that there is
more than one relation falling under the general heading of “equality”.
Thus, to explain formulas like (3.4), Euler elaborated two distinct ways,
arithmetic and geometric, of comparing quantities. He described the
two modalities of comparison in the following terms:
Since we are going to show that an infinitely small quan-
tity is really zero [cyphra], we must meet the objection
of why we do not always use the same symbol 0 for infin-
itely small quantities, rather than some special ones. . .
[S]ince we have two ways to compare them [a more pre-
cise translation would be “there are two modalities of
comparison”], either arithmetic or geometric, let us look
at the quotients of quantities to be compared in order
to see the difference. ([Euler 2000] § 84)
Furthermore,
If we accept the notation used in the analysis of the infi-
nite, then dx indicates a quantity that is infinitely small,
so that both dx = 0 and a dx = 0, where a is any finite
quantity. Despite this, the geometric ratio a dx : dx is
finite, namely a : 1. For this reason, these two infinitely
small quantities, dx and a dx, both being equal to 0,
cannot be confused when we consider their ratio. In a
similar way, we will deal with infinitely small quanti-
ties dx and dy. (ibid., § 86, p. 51-52) (emphasis added)
Having defined the two modalities of comparison of quantities, arith-
metic and geometric, Euler proceeds to clarify the difference between
them as follows:
Let a be a finite quantity and let dx be infinitely small.
The arithmetic ratio of equals is clear: Since ndx = 0,
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we have
a± ndx− a = 0. (3.5)
On the other hand, the geometric ratio is clearly of
equals, since
a± ndx
a
= 1. (3.6)
[Euler 2000, § 87].
While Euler speaks of distinct modalities of comparison, he writes them
down symbolically in terms of two distinct relations, both denoted by
the equality sign “=”; namely, (3.5) and (3.6). Euler concludes as
follows:
From this we obtain the well-known rule that the infin-
itely small vanishes in comparison with the finite and
hence can be neglected [with respect to it]. [Euler 2000,
§ 87] (emphasis in the original)
The “well-known rule” is an allusion to l’Hoˆpital’s Demande ou Sup-
position discussed in Section 4.1.
Note that in the Latin original, the italicized phrase reads infinite
parva prae finitis evanescant, atque adeo horum respectu reiici queant.
The words “with respect to it” (horum respectu) do not appear in
Blanton’s translation. We restored them because of their importance
for understanding Euler’s phrase. The term evanescant can mean ei-
ther vanish or lapse, but the term prae makes it read literally as “the
infinitely small vanishes before (or by the side of ) the finite,” implying
that the infinitesimal disappears because of the finite, and only once it
is compared to the finite.
To comment on Euler’s phrase in more detail, a possible interpre-
tation is that any motion or activity involved in the term evanescant
does not indicate that the infinitesimal quantity is a dynamic entity
that is (in and of itself) in a state of disappearing, but rather is a
static entity that changes, or disappears, only “with respect to” (ho-
rum respectu) a finite entity. To Euler, the infinitesimal has a different
status depending on what it is being compared to. The passage sug-
gests that Euler’s usage accords more closely with reasoning exploiting
static infinitesimals than with dynamic limit-type reasoning.
Euler proceeds to present the usual rules going back to Leibniz,
L’Hoˆpital, and the Bernoullis, such as
a dxm + b dxn = a dxm (3.7)
provided m < n “since dxn vanishes compared with dxm” (ibid., § 89),
relying on his geometric comparison. Euler introduces a distinction
INTERPRETING LEIBNIZ AND EULER 21
between infinitesimals of different order, and directly computes a ra-
tio dx±dx
2
dx
of two particular infinitesimals by means of the calculation
dx± dx2
dx
= 1± dx = 1, (3.8)
assigning the value 1 to it (ibid., § 88). Note that rather than proving
that the expression is equal to 1 (such indirect proofs are a trademark
of the ǫ, δ approach), Euler directly computes (what would today be
formalized as the standard part of) the expression.7 Euler combines the
informal and formal stages by discarding the higher-order infinitesimal
as in (3.6) and (3.8). Such an inferential move is formalized in modern
infinitesimal analysis in terms of the standard part function or shadow ;
see Section 4.2. Euler concludes:
Although all of them [infinitely small quantities] are
equal to 0, still they must be carefully distinguished one
from the other if we are to pay attention to their mu-
tual relationships, which has been explained through a
geometric ratio (ibid., § 89).
Like Leibniz in his Symbolismus [Leibniz 1710], Euler considers more
than one way of comparing quantities. Euler’s formula (3.6) indicates
that his geometric comparison is procedurally identical with the Leib-
nizian TLH (see Section 3.3): namely, both Euler’s geometric compar-
ison and Leibniz’s TLH involve discarding higher-order terms in the
context of a generalized relation of equality, as in (3.6) and (3.7).
Note that there were alternative theories around 1700, such as the
one was proposed by Nieuwentijt. Nieuwentijt’s system, unlike Leib-
niz’s system, possessed only first-order infinitesimals with square zero
[Nieuwentijt 1695]; [Vermij 1989]; [Mancosu 1996, chapter 6]. It is
clear that the Eulerian hierarchy of orders of infinitesimals follows Leib-
niz’s lead.
Euler’s geometric comparison was dubbed “the principle of cancel-
lation” in [Ferraro 2004, p. 47]; see Section 4.4 for a more detailed
discussion of Euler’s zero infinitesimals.
3.5. Infinite product formula for sine. In Section 2.5 we analyzed
a pair of approaches to interpreting the work of the pioneers of analysis,
namely the A-track in the context of an Archimedean continuum, and
7To give an elementary example, the determination of the limit limx→0
x+x2
x
in
the ǫ, δ approach would involve first guessing the correct answer, L = 1, by using
informal reasoning with small quantities; and then formally choosing a suitable δ
for every ǫ in such a way that x+x
2
x
turns out to be within ǫ of L if |x| < δ.
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the B-track in the context of a Bernoullian continuum (an infinitesimal-
enriched continuum). We explore a B-track framework as a proxy for
the Eulerian procedures ; here we leave aside the ontological or foun-
dational issues, as discussed in Section 2.4. We will analyze specific
procedures and inferential moves in Euler’s oeuvre and argue that the
essential use he makes of both infinitesimals and infinite integers is
accounted for more successfully in a B-track framework.
The fruitfulness of Euler’s approach based on infinitesimals can be
illustrated by some of the remarkable applications he obtained. Thus,
Euler derived an infinite product decomposition for the sine and sinh
functions of the following form:
sinh x = x
(
1 +
x2
π2
)(
1 +
x2
4π2
)(
1 +
x2
9π2
)(
1 +
x2
16π2
)
. . . (3.9)
sin x = x
(
1− x
2
π2
)(
1− x
2
4π2
)(
1− x
2
9π2
)(
1− x
2
16π2
)
. . .(3.10)
(see Introductio [Euler 1748, § 155–164]). Here (3.10) generalizes an
infinite product formula for pi
4
(or pi
2
) due to Wallis; see [Wallis 2004,
Proposition 191]. Namely, Wallis obtained the following infinite prod-
uct:
∏
n=1
(
2n
2n− 1 ·
2n
2n+ 1
)
=
2
1
· 2
3
· 4
3
· 4
5
· 6
5
· 6
7
· 8
7
· 8
9
· · · = π
2
.
Evaluating Euler’s product decomposition sinx
x
=
∏
n=1
(
1− x2
n2pi2
)
at
x = pi
2
one obtains 2
pi
=
∏
n=1
(
1− 1
4n2
)
or pi
2
=
∏
n=1
(
4n2
4n2−1
)
. It follows
that pi
2
=
∏
n=1
(
2n
2n−1 · 2n2n+1
)
, in other words pi
2
= 2
1
· 2
3
· 4
3
· 4
5
· 6
5
· 6
7
· · · .
Euler also summed the inverse square series: 1+ 1
4
+ 1
9
+ 1
16
+ . . . = pi
2
6
;
this is the so-called Basel problem. This identity results from (3.10) by
comparing the coefficient of x3 of the two sides and using the Maclaurin
series for sine. This is one of Euler’s four solutions to the Basel problem;
see [Sandifer 2007, p. 111].
A common feature of these formulas is that Euler’s computations
involve not only infinitesimals but also infinitely large natural numbers,
which Euler sometimes treats as if they were ordinary natural numbers.
Euler’s proof of the product decompositions (3.9) and (3.10) rely
on infinitesimalist procedures that find close proxies in modern infini-
tesimal frameworks. In Appendix A we present a detailed analysis of
Euler’s proof.
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3.6. Law of continuity. Euler’s working assumption is that infinite
numbers satisfy the same rules of arithmetic as ordinary numbers.
Thus, he applies the binomial formula to the case of an infinite expo-
nent i without any further ado in [Euler 1748, § 115]; see formula (3.2)
above. The assumption was given the following expression in 1755:
The analysis of the infinite, which we begin to treat now,
is nothing but a special case of the method of differences,
explained in the first chapter, wherein the differences are
infinitely small, while previously the differences were as-
sumed to be finite. [Euler 2000, § 114] (emphasis added)
The significance of this passage was realized by Bos (who gives a slightly
different translation; see Section 4.10). Euler’s assumption is consonant
with the Leibnizian law of continuity :
il se trouve que les re`gles du fini re´ussissent dans l’infini. . .
et que vice versa les re`gles de l’infini re´ussissent dans le
fini” [Leibniz 1702]
though apparently Euler does not refer explicitly to the latter in this
particular sense. Robinson wrote:
Leibniz did say . . . that what succeeds for the finite
numbers succeeds also for the infinite numbers and vice
versa, and this is remarkably close to our transfer of
statements from R to ∗R and in the opposite direction.
[Robinson 1966, p. 266].
On the transfer principle see Section 4.6. Euler treats infinite series as
polynomials of a specific infinite order (see Section 4.9 for a discussion
of the difference between finite and infinite sums in Euler). In the
context of a discussion of the infinite product(
1 +
x
i
+
x2
4π2
)(
1 +
x
i
+
x2
16π2
)
(
1 +
x
i
+
x2
36π2
)(
1 +
x
i
+
x2
64π2
)
· · · ,
(3.11)
where i is an infinite integer, Euler notes that a summand given by
an infinitesimal fraction x
i
occurs in each factor. One may be tempted
therefore to discard it. The reason such an infinitesimal summand
cannot be discarded according to Euler, is because it affects infinitely
many factors:
through the multiplication of all factors, which are 1
2
i
in number [i being an infinitely large integer], there
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is a produced term x
2
, so that x
i
cannot be omitted
[Euler 1748, § 156].
In more detail, when one has a single factor, one can typically ne-
glect the infinitesimal x
i
. However, in this case one has i
2
factors, and
the linear term in the product will be the sum of the linear terms in
each factor. This is one of the Vieta rules that still holds when i is
infinite by the law of continuity. Altogether there are i
2
factors, each
of which contains a linear term x
i
. Therefore altogether one obtains a
contribution of i
2
· x
i
= x
2
, which is appreciable (noninfinitesimal) and
therefore cannot be neglected.
Euler’s comment in 1748 shows that he clearly realizes that the infin-
itesimal x
i
present in each of the factors of (3.11) cannot be discarded
at will. While in 1755, the preliminary status of the infinitesimal is
officially “zero”, in actual calculations Euler does not rely on such
preliminary declarations, as noted by Bos (see Section 4.5 and Sec-
tion 4.10).
Leibniz’s differentials dx were infinitesimals, and while Leibniz did
also consider non-infinitesimal differentials, he always denoted them
by the symbol (d)x rather than dx;8 see Section 3.2 for a discussion
of Leibnizian infinitesimals. There does not seem to be a compelling
reason to think that Euler’s dx’s were not infinitesimals, either. Ferraro
appears to acknowledge this point when he writes: “Euler often simply
treats differentials and infinitesimals as the same thing (for instance, see
Euler [1755, 70])” [Ferraro 2004, p. 35, note 2]. Indeed, the formula ω =
dx appears in [Euler 1755, § 118].
Note that Euler explicitly refers to the number of factors in his in-
finite product, expressed by a specific infinite integer. Similarly, when
he applies the binomial formula (a + b)i with an infinite exponent i,
there is an implied final term, or terminal summand, such as bi, though
it never appears explicitly in the formulas (see Section 4.9). We will
analyze Euler’s proof in detail in Appendix A.
3.7. The original rule of l’Hoˆpital. Euler’s use of l’Hoˆpital’s rule
needs to be understood in its historical context. Most calculus courses
today present the so-called l’Hoˆpital’s rule in a setting purged of in-
finitesimals. It is important to set the record straight as to the nature of
the original rule as presented by l’Hoˆpital in his Analyse des Infiniment
Petits pour l’Intelligence des Lignes Courbes.
8Note that [Bos 1974] used the notation dx for Leibniz’s (d)x.
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Two points should be kept in mind here. First, L’Hoˆpital did not
formulate his rule in terms of accumulation points, limits, epsilons, and
deltas, but rather in terms of infinitesimals:
Cela pose´, si l’on imagine une applique´e bd infiniment
proche de BD, & qui rencontre les lignes courbes ANB,
COB aux points f, g; l’on aura bd = AB×bf
bg
, laquelle∗
ne diffe`re pas de BD [l’Hoˆpital 1696, p. 145]. (emphasis
added)
A note in the right margin at the level of the asterisk following the
word laquelle reads “ ∗Art. 1.” The asterisk refers the reader to the
following item:
I. Demande ou Supposition.
. . . On demande qu’on puisse prendre indiffe´remment
l’une pour l’autre deux quantite´s qui ne different entr’elles
que d’une quantite´ infiniment petite [l’Hoˆpital 1696, p. 2].
(emphasis added)
Clearly, Euler relied on l’Hoˆpital’s original version of the rule rather
than any modern paraphrase thereof. The original version of l’Hoˆpital’s
rule exploited infinitesimals. It seems reasonable therefore that if one
were to seek to understand Euler’s procedures in a modern framework,
it would be preferable to do so in a modern framework that features
infinitesimals rather than in one that doesn’t.
Our second point is that Euler’s procedures admit a B-track intrepre-
tation in terms of an infinitesimal value of z, and a relation
λ ≈ 1− x
z
z
(3.12)
of being infinitely close, or Euler’s geometric comparison; see Sec-
tion 3.4. These concepts are, on the one hand, closer to Euler’s world,
and, on the other, admit rigorous proxies in the context of a modern B-
continuum (such as the hyperreals), namely the relation λ = st
(
1−xz
z
)
involving the standard part function “st”. Arguably, the B-track for-
mula (3.12) is a better proxy for understanding Euler’s infinitesimal
argument than is Ferraro’s A-track formula (4.1).
3.8. Euclid’s quantity. The classical notion of quantity is Euclid’s
µε´γεϑoς (magnitude). The general term magnitude covers line seg-
ments, triangles, rectangles, squares, convex polygones, angles, arcs of
circles and solids. A general theory of magnitude is developed in the
Elements, Book V. In fact, Book V is a masterpiece of deductive de-
velopment. By formalizing its definitions (see below the formalisation
of Definition V.4) and the tacit assumptions behind its proofs, one can
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reconstruct Book V and its 25 propositions as an axiomatic theory.
[Beckmann 1967/1968] and [B laszczyk & Mro´wka 2013, pp. 101–122]
provide detailed sources for the axioms below in the primary source
(Euclid). See also [Mueller 1981, pp. 118–148] which mostly follows
Beckmann’s development. [Heiberg 1883-1888] is the standard modern
edition of Elements.
As a result, Euclid’s magnitudes of the same kind (line segments
being of one kind, triangles being of another, etc.) can be formalized
as an ordered additive semigroup with a total order < characterized by
the following five axioms:
E1 (∀x, y)(∃n ∈ N)[nx > y],
E2 (∀x, y)(∃z)[x < y ⇒ x+ z = y],
E3 (∀x, y, z)[x < y ⇒ x+ z < y + z],
E4 (∀x)(∀n ∈ N)(∃y)[x = ny],
E5 (∀x, y, z)(∃v)[x : y :: z : v].
Here axiom E1 formalizes Elements, Definition V.4. More specifically,
Euclid’s definition reads:
Magnitudes [such as a, b] are said to have a ratio with
respect to one another which, being multiplied [i.e., na]
are capable of exceeding one another [i.e., na > b].
The definition can be formalized as follows: (∀a, b)(∃n)(na > b). This
reading of Euclid V.4 is a standard interpretation among historians; see
[Beckmann 1967/1968, pp. 31–34]; [Mueller 1981, p. 139]; [De Risi 2016,
Section II.3].
The early modern mathematics developed largely without reference
to the Archimedean axiom. Some medieval editions of Elements sim-
ply omitted the definition V.4; more precisely, they give Proportion is
a similarity of ratios instead of definition V.4 of our modern editions;
see [Grant 1974, p. 137]. The same applies to C. Clavius’ Euclidis Ele-
mentorum, one of the most popular 17th century edition of Elements ;
see [Clavius 1589, p. 529].
We do not find any explicit reference to the Archimedean axiom in
the works of Stevin, Descartes, Newton (though there is a mention of
Euclid’s axiom in Leibniz’s letter to l’Hoˆpital [Leibniz 1695, p. 288]),
nor in the works of Euler. Even the classical constructions of the real
numbers provided in 1872 by Heine, Cantor and Dedekind contain no
explicit mention of the Archimedean axiom, as it was recognized as such
only in 1880s by Stolz; see Section 3.9. The Archimedean axiom follows
from the continuity axiom (Dedekind axiom) and is equivalent to both
the absence of infinitesimals and the cofinality of the integers within the
reals defined in those constructions. It took time for mathematicians
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to understand the precise relation between the continuity axiom and
the Archimedean axiom. It was not until 1901 that Ho¨lder proved
that the continuity axiom (more precisely, Dedekind axiom) implies
the Archimedean axiom; see [Ho¨lder 1901] and [Ho¨lder 1996].
3.9. Stolz and Heiberg. Otto Stolz in [Stolz 1885] rediscovered the
Archimedean axiom for mathematicians, making it one of his axioms for
magnitudes. The Archimedean axiom was studied earlier in [Stolz 1883],
while [Stolz 1885] was a popular and widely read book. Stolz coined
the term Archimedean axiom. As the source of this axiom he points out
Archimedes’ treatises On the sphere and cylinder and The quadrature
of the parabola. As regards Euclid, Stolz refers to books X and XII. He
does not seem to have noticed that definition 4 of book V is related
to the axiom of Archimedes. Johan L. Heiberg in his comment on the
Archimedean axiom (lemma) cites Euclid’s definition V.4 and observes
that “these are the same axioms” [Heiberg 1881, p. 11]. Possibly as a
result of his comment Euclid’s definition V.4 is called the Archimedean
axiom.
At the end of the 19th century, Euclid’s theory of magnitude was re-
vived by [Stolz 1885], [Weber 1895], and [Ho¨lder 1901]. These authors
developed axiomatic theories of magnitude. For a modern account of
these theories see [B laszczyk 2013]. Despite certain differences, they
all accept axioms E1–E4 of Section 3.8 as a common characterisation
of magnitude. Instead of E5, some authors tend to use the Dedekind
axiom of continuity, which implies E5. Ho¨lder was the first one to show
that E1 follows from E2–E4 and the Dedekind continuity axiom.
Thus, while axiom E1 is a feature of the classic and modern notion
of magnitude, it is absent from Euler’s characterisation of quantity.
Moreover, Euler is explicit about the existence of infinite quantities;
see Section 3.10.
In the Eulerian context, a magnitude, or quantity, is not (yet) a
number. Euler’s quantities are converted to numbers once one specifies
an arbitrary quantity as the unit, or unity. In addition to a unity, Euler
needs a notion of a ratio. Euler’s definition is similar to Newton’s:
the determination, or the measure of magnitude of all
kinds, is reduced to this: fix at pleasure upon any one
known magnitude of the same species with that which is
to be determined, and consider it as themeasure or unit ;
then, determine the proportion [ratio] of the proposed
magnitude to this known measure. This proportion [ra-
tio] is always expressed by numbers; so that a number
is nothing but the proportion [ratio] of one magnitude
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to another arbitrarily assumed as the unit [Euler 1771,
§ 4].
However, neither Newton nor Euler provide a definition of ratio. The
term proportion corresponds to the term Verha¨ltnis (ratio) in the Ger-
man edition of Euler’s Algebra, and to rapport (ratio) in the French
edition [Euler 1807].
3.10. Euler on infinite numbers and quantities. Euler is explicit
about the existence of infinite (and therefore non-Archimedean) quan-
tities and numbers:
not only is it possible to give a quantity of this kind,
to which increments are added without limit, a certain
character, and with due care to introduce it into calcu-
lus, as we shall soon see at length, but also there exist
real cases, at least they can be conceived, in which an
infinite number actually exists [Euler 2000, § 75].
Euler’s important qualification “at least they can be conceived” with
regard to the existence of infinite numbers is consistent with the Leib-
nizian idea of them as useful fictions ; see Section 3.3.
4. Critique of Ferraro’s approach
Ferraro’s recent text on Euler seeks to steer clear of certain inter-
pretive approaches to Euler: “My point of view is different from that
of some recent papers, such as [McKinzie-Tuckey 1997] and [Pourciau
2001]. In this writing the authors recast the early procedures directly
in terms of the modern foundation of analysis or interpret the earlier
results in terms of modern theory of non-standard analysis and un-
derstand the results in the light of this later context” [Ferraro 2012,
p. 2].
Ferraro’s 2012 piece has significant textual overlap with his article
from 2004. Here Ferraro asserts that “one can see in operation in their
writings a conception of mathematics which is quite extraneous to that
of Euler . . . the attempt to specify Euler’s notions by applying modern
concepts is only possible if elements are used which are essentially alien
to them, and thus Eulerian mathematics is transformed into something
wholly different” [Ferraro 2004, pp. 51-52]; cf. [Ferraro 2012, p. 2] (em-
phasis added). In 2004 Ferraro included two articles by Laugwitz in
the list of such allegedly “extraneous” and “alien” approaches: the ar-
ticle [Laugwitz 1989] in Archive for History of Exact Sciences, as well
as [Laugwitz 1992b].
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Ferraro’s comments here betray an insufficient sensitivity to the dis-
tinction analyzed in Section 2.4, namely, isolating methodological con-
cerns from obvious problems of ontology as far as Euler’s infinitesimals
are concerned. Granted, modern set-theoretic frameworks, customarily
taken to be an ontological account of the foundations of mathemat-
ics, are alien to Euler’s world. But is Laugwitz’s approach to Euler’s
methodology really “extraneous” or “alien” to Euler? Interpretive ap-
proaches seek to clarify Euler’s mathematical procedures through the
lens of modern formalisations. In the passage cited above, Ferraro
appears initially to reject such approaches, whether they rely on mod-
ern ǫ, δ interpretations a` la Weierstrass, or on infinitesimal interpreta-
tions a` la Robinson. Yet in 2004, Ferraro writes:
I am not claiming that 18th-century mathematics should
be investigated without considering modern theories.
Modern concepts are essential for understanding 18th-
century notions and why these led to meaningful re-
sults, even when certain procedures, puzzling from the
present views, were used. [Ferraro 2004, p. 52] (empha-
sis added)
(a similar passage appears in [Ferraro 2012, p. 2]). Thus, in the end
Ferraro does need modern theories to “understand” (as he puts it)
Euler, even though such procedures are “meaningless” to the latter.
Ferraro’s position needs to be clarified, since any modern attempt to
understand Euler will necessarily interpret him, as well. While reject-
ing Laugwitz’s interpretive approach to Euler, Ferraro does seek to
understand, and therefore interpret, Euler by modern means. To pin-
point the difference between Laugwitz’s interpretive approach (rejected
by Ferraro) and Ferraro’s own interpretive approach, let us examine a
sample of Ferraro’s reading of Euler.
4.1. From l’Hoˆpital and Euler to epsilon and delta. Ferraro deals
with an infinitesimal calculation in [Euler 1730-1731, pp. 11-12] where
Euler sought the value of
1− x
g
f+g
g
for f = 1 and g = 0 by applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule to 1−x
z
z
. Ferraro
proceeds to present the problem “from a modern perspective” by an-
alyzing the function f(z) = 1−x
z
z
and its behavior near z = 0 in the
passage already cited in Section 2.1, featuring the formula
λ = lim
z→c
f(z) (4.1)
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(as already noted, cmust be replaced by 0). Here the formula label (4.1)
is added for later reference.
On the face of it, Ferraro merely explains what it means to a modern
reader to extend a function by continuity at a point where the function
is undefined. However, Ferraro’s presentation of a modern explanation,
with its talk of accumulation points, limits, epsilons, and deltas, is
firmly grounded in an A-track interpretation of the Eulerian calculation
using l’Hoˆpital’s rule. But why should one seek to “understand” Euler
using A-methodology?
In Section 3.7 we placed Euler’s use of l’Hoˆpital’s rule in its histori-
acal context. What Ferraro presents here is an (ǫ, δ) a` la Weierstrass
formalisation of Euler’s procedure. He goes on to point out that such
an approach would be “meaningless” to Euler. Nevertheless, Ferraro
goes on to make the following remarkable claim:
there is something in common between the Eulerian
procedure and the modern one based upon the notion
of limit: evanescent quantities and endlessly increasing
quantities were based upon an intuitive and primordial
idea of two quantities approaching each other. I refer
to this idea as “protolimit” to avoid any possibility of a
modern interpretation [Ferraro 2004, p. 46].
Thus according to Ferraro, there is “something in common between the
Eulerian procedure and the modern one,” after all. Ferraro’s protolimit
is intended to be different from the (A-track) limit. But shouldn’t we
rather interpret Eulerian infinitesimals in terms of, say, a protoshadow?
The term shadow is sometimes employed to refer to the (B-track) stan-
dard part function, discussed in Section 4.2.
4.2. Shadow. In any totally ordered field extension E of R, every
finite element x ∈ E is infinitely close to a suitable unique element,
namely its standard part x0 ∈ R.9
Ferraro finds fault with the standard part function as a tool in in-
tepreting Euler’s equality i−1
i
= 1. Ferraro writes that the equality
“should not be intended as i−1
i
≈ 1” [Ferraro 2004, p. 49] and provides
the following clarification in footnote 36 on page 49: “By a ≈ b, I
mean that the difference a − b is an infinitesimal hyperreal number.”
9Indeed, via the total order, the element x defines a Dedekind cut on R. By the
usual procedure, the cut specifies a real number x0 ∈ R ⊆ E. The number x0 is
infinitely close to x ∈ E. The subring Ef ⊆ E consisting of the finite (i.e., limited)
elements of E therefore admits a map st : Ef → R, x 7→ x0, called the standard
part function, or shadow, whose role is to round off each finite (limited) x to the
nearest real x0.
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The criticism recurs in [Ferraro 2012, p. 10] where the standard part
function is mentioned explicitly. However, this criticism only raises an
issue if one assumes that Euler’s equalities were not approximate but,
rather, exact equalities. Such an assumption may be too simplistic a
reading of Euler’s stance on arithmetic and geometric comparisons ; see
Section 3. See also Appendix A, Step 5 and formula (A.6) where Euler
wrote that the term x2/i2 is negligible in each of the factors of ex− e−x
only because the number of the said factors is small compared to i2.
Ferraro wrote that “from the modern perspective, the problem of
extending the function” is interpreted in terms of accumulation points,
A-track limits, epsilons, and deltas.
But couldn’t we perhaps surmise, instead, that “from a modern per-
spective, the problem of extending the function may involve infinitesi-
mals, the relation of being infinitely close, and standard part”?
Ferraro’s claim that Eulerian infinitesimals “were symbols that rep-
resented a primordial and intuitive idea of limit” [Ferraro 2004, p. 34],
with its exclusive focus on the limit concept in its generic meaning,
tends to blur the distinction between the rival Weierstrassian and
modern-infinitesimal methodologies (see Section 2.5). Eulerian infinites-
imals are intrinsically not Archimedean but rather follow the method-
ology of his teacher Bernoulli, co-founder with Leibniz of what we refer
to as the B-track. A better methodological proxy for Eulerian in-
finitesimals than Ferraro’s “primordial limit” is provided by a modern
B-track approach to analysis, fundamentally different from Ferraro’s
A-track (proto)limit.
Meanwhile, Laugwitz sought to formalize Euler’s procedures in terms
of modern infinitesimal methodologies. It emerges that, while Ferraro’s
own A-track reading is deemed “essential for understanding eighteenth-
century notions and why these led to meaningful results” as claimed
in [Ferraro 2012, p. 2], Laugwitz’s infinitesimal interpretation is re-
jected by Ferraro as being both “extraneous” and “alien” to Euler’s
mathematics. In short, Laugwitz’s interpretation does not fit Fer-
raro’s Procrustean A-track way of, as he put it, “understanding” Euler
[Ferraro 2012, p. 2].
4.3. B-track reading in Felix Klein. Laugwitz’s interpretation ac-
cords with Felix Klein’s remarks on the dual tracks for the develop-
ment of analysis as found in [Klein 1908, p. 214]. In 1908, Felix Klein
described a rivalry of the dual approaches as we saw in Section 2.5.
Klein went on to formulate a criterion for what would qualify as a suc-
cessful theory of infinitesimals. A similar criterion was formulated in
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[Fraenkel 1928, pp. 116-117]. For a discussion of the Klein–Fraenkel cri-
terion see [Kanovei, Katz & Mormann 2013, Section 6.1]. The criterion
was formulated in terms of the mean value theorem. Klein concluded:
I will not say that progress in this direction is impossible,
but it is true that none of the investigators have achieved
anything positive [Klein 1908, p. 219].
Thus, the B-track approach based on notions of infinitesimals is not
limited to “the work of Fermat, Newton, Leibniz and many others in the
17th and 18th centuries,” as implied by Victor J. Katz in [Katz 2014].
Rather, it was very much a current research topic in Felix Klein’s mind.
See [Ehrlich 2006] for detailed coverage of the work on infinitesimals
around 1900.
Of course, Klein in 1908 had no idea at all of Robinson’s hyperreal
framework as first developed in [Robinson 1961]. What Klein was refer-
ring to is the procedural issue of how analysis is to be presented, rather
than the ontological issue of a specific realisation of an infinitesimal-
enriched field in the context of a traditional set theory; see Section 2.4.
Finally, we note that A-track readings of Euler tend to be external to
Euler’s procedures, whereas infinitesimal readings are internal,10 in the
sense that it provides proxies for both the procedures and the results of
the historical infinitesimal mathematics. This is possible because mod-
ern infinitesimal procedures incorporate both infinitesimals and infinite
numbers as do Eulerian procedures. Meanwhile, the Weierstrassian ap-
proach tends to provide proxies for the results but not the procedures,
since both infinitesimals and infinite numbers have been eliminated in
this approach.
4.4. Hidden lemmas and principle of cancellation. Laugwitz ar-
gued that Euler’s derivation of the power series expansion of ax contains
a hidden lemma, to the effect that a certain infinite sum of infinitesimals
is itself infinitesimal under suitable conditions; see [Laugwitz 1989,
p. 210]. Namely, let i be infinite. Consider Euler’s formula(
1 +
kz
i
)i
= 1 + kz +
i− 1
2i
k2z2 +
(i− 1)(i− 2)
2i · 3i k
3z3 + . . . ,
or alternatively(
1 +
kz
i
)i
= 1+
i
i
kz+
i(i− 1)
i · 2i k
2z2 +
i(i− 1)(i− 2)
i · 2i · 3i k
3z3 + . . . (4.2)
10This use of the term internal is not to be confused with its technical meaning in
the context of enlargements of superstructures; see [Goldblatt 1998].
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There are infinitely many summands on the right. [Euler 1748, § 115–
116] goes on to make the substitutions
i− 1
i
= 1,
i− 1
2i
=
1
2
,
i− 2
3i
=
1
3
, . . . (4.3)
which he justifies by invoking the fact that i is infinite. The result is the
exponential series. The effect of these changes is cumulative, since the
products involved contain an ever increasing number of factors. Thus,
one needs to make the substitution
(i− 1)(i− 2) · · · (i− n) = in
for each finite n in the righthand side, but there are still infinitely
many summands affected. Each of these substitutions entails an infin-
itesimal change but there are infinitely many substitutions involved in
evaluating (4.2).
Ferraro takes issue with Laugwitz’s contention in the following terms:
It is evident that Laugwitz’s remark arises from the in-
terpretation of i−1
i
= 1 as i−1
i
≈ 1. This interpretation
contrasts with the Eulerian statement that a + dx = a is
an exact equality and not an approximate one [Ferraro 2004,
p. 49].
Ferraro goes on to assert that, contrary to Laugwitz’s claim, Euler
did not see gaps in the proof of [the series expansion
of ax], and this was due to the fact that he under-
stood i−1
i
= 1 as a formal equality involving fictitious
entities [Ferraro 2004, p. 50].
Indeed, if i−1
i
= 1 were an exact equality along with the other ex-
pressions in (4.3), the evaluation of the righthand side of (4.2) to the
exponential series would be immediate and free of any gaps, as Ferraro
contends.
Alas, Ferraro underestimates Euler’s perceptiveness here. Ferraro
does not explain how an invocation of “a formal equality involving
fictitious entities” deflects Laugwitz’s contention that Euler’s proof
contains a hidden lemma. Ferraro’s insistence on the “exact equal-
ity” i−1
i
= 1 suggests that the infinitesimal “error” in i−1
i
= 1, or
1− 1
i
= 1, (4.4)
is to be understood as exactly zero. Declaring the infinitesimal “er-
ror” 1
i
to be exactly zero would obviate the need for justifying the
hidden lemma, since an infinite sum of zeros is still zero, or at any rate
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so Ferraro appears to interpret Euler’s argument. We will return to
Ferraro’s “fictitious entities” in Section 4.8.
4.5. Two problems with Ferraro’s reading. There are two prob-
lems with Ferraro’s claim that Euler is invoking an exact equality with
no infinitesimal error. First, Euler explicitly writes otherwise (see Sec-
tion 3.6 on the issue of disappearing infinitesimals), and in fact in
the calculation under discussion, Euler exploits the relation z = ωi
[Euler 1748, § 115] with infinitesimal ω and finite z, which would be
quite impossible if ω were literally zero.
The second problem is that, as Ferraro himself noted in his recent
text, Euler expressed the integral as “the sum of an infinite number
of infinitesimals” [Ferraro 2012, p. 10]. Euler expresses the integral in
terms of the expression
α(A+ A′ + A′′ + A′′′ + . . .+X) (4.5)
in [Euler 1768-1770, Chapter VII, p. 184], where α is an infinitesimal
step of a suitable partition, while A, A′, A′′, A′′′, . . . are the (finite)
values of the integrand at (infinitely many) partition points. The quan-
tities
αA, αA′, αA′′, αA′′′, . . .
are still infinitesimal, and therefore would be exactly zero, so that their
infinite sum (4.5) would be paradoxically zero as well. Thus, such a
reading of Euler’s reasoning attributes to him an alarming paradox not
dealt with in Ferraro’s approach.
Ferraro mentions Euler’s interpretation of the integral as an infinite
sum of infinitesimals in [Ferraro 2004, p. 50, footnote 39], but fails to
explain how the paradox mentioned in the previous paragraph could be
resolved (other than implying that infinitesimals are sometimes zero,
and sometimes not).
In sum, we agree with Bos’ evaluation of Euler’s preliminary re-
marks on “infinitesimals as zeros” as being at variance with his actual
mathematical practice (see Section 4.10). It is unlikely that a literal
interpretation of Euler’s preliminary remarks (that the infinitesimal is
exactly zero) could give a fruitful way of interpreting Euler’s mathe-
matics. Ferraro’s rejection of Laugwitz’s analysis of Euler’s argument
in terms of a hidden lemma (requiring further justification) is therefore
untenable.
4.6. Generality of algebra. It was known already to Cauchy that
some of Euler’s doctrines are unsatisfactory. More specifically, Cauchy
was critical of Euler’s and Lagrange’s generality of algebra, to the ef-
fect that certain relations involving variable quantities are viewed as
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being valid even though they can fail for certain specific values of the
variables. By the time mathematicians started analyzing Fourier series
in the 1820s it became clear that some applications of the generality of
algebra are untenable. Cauchy specifically rejects this principle in the
introduction to his Re´sume´ des Lec¸ons [Cauchy 1823].
In the context of a discussion of Euler’s principle of the generality of
algebra, Ferraro notes that the Eulerian “general quantity”
was represented by graphic signs which were manipu-
lated according to appropriate rules, which were the
same rules that governed geometrical quantities or true
numbers [Ferraro 2004, p. 43].
The idea that “the same rules” should govern ideal/fictional numbers
and “true numbers” is consonant with the Leibnizian law of continu-
ity. The latter is arguably a fruitful methodological principle. It was
formalized as the transfer principle in Robinson’s framework.11
Meanwhile, Ferraro fails to distinguish between, on the one hand, a
historically fruitful law of continuity, and, on the other, the generality
of algebra that was found to be lacking in the 19th century, as he
continues in the next sentence:
The principle of the generality of algebra held: the rules
were applied in general, regardless of their conditions of
validity and the specific values of quantity (ibid.).
Cauchy’s critique of Euler’s principle of the generality of algebra is
well known to historians; it is an uncontroversial statement that certain
elements of Euler’s oeuvre need to be reinterpreted if one is to develop
a consistent interpretation thereof. Another such element is the zero
infinitesimal, as discussed in Section 4.7.
4.7. Unsettling identity. The claim that the infinitesimal is exactly
equal to zero occasionally does appear in Euler’s writing, such as in the
Institutiones in reference to dx. On the other hand, Euler specifically
discusses varieties of the notion of equality, with the geometric no-
tion being similar to the generalized relation of equality implied in the
11The transfer principle is a type of theorem that, depending on the context, asserts
that rules, laws or procedures valid for a certain number system, still apply (i.e.,
are “transfered”) to an extended number system. Thus, the familiar extension Q ⊆
R preserves the properties of an ordered field. To give a negative example, the
extension R ⊆ R ∪ {±∞} of the real numbers to the so-called extended reals does
not preserve the properties of an ordered field. The hyperreal extension R ⊆ ∗R
preserves all first-order properties, such as the identity sin2 x+cos2 x = 1 (valid for
all hyperreal x, including infinitesimal and infinite values of x ∈ ∗R). For a more
detailed discussion, see the textbook Elementary Calculus [Keisler 1986].
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Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity (see Section 3.4). Even
though at times Euler insists that his equality is exact equality, at other
times he does envision more general modalities of comparison. Ferraro
himself implicitly acknowledges this when he describes Euler’s equal-
ity a + dx = a as a “principle of cancellation” [Ferraro 2004, p. 47].
The term principle of cancellation would appear to imply that there is
something to cancel : not merely an exact zero, but a nonzero infinites-
imal dx.
On an even more basic level, if for infinite i one has 1
i
= 0 as in (4.4),
then multiplying out by i we obtain 1 = 0× i, but 0 times any number
is still 0, so that we would obtain an unsettling identity 1 = 0 (at least
if we interpret “=” as literal equality), in addition to the paradox with
the integral mentioned above.
Similarly, Euler seeks to divide by an infinitesimal dx so as to obtain
the differential ratio dy
dx
. It follows that dx cannot be an exact zero if
one is to have any hope for a consistent account of Euler’s procedures.
A notion of zero infinitesimal interpreted literally is arguably as prob-
lematic as some aspects of the principle of the generality of algebra
already found to be lacking by Cauchy (see Section 4.6). It can be
reinterpreted in terms of the distinction between cyphra and nihil as
discussed in Section 3.2.
4.8. Fictitious entities. Ferraro described the Eulerian substitution
i−1
i
= 1 as a “formal equality involving fictitious entities” in his text
[Ferraro 2004, p. 50]. It is not entirely clear how such an evocation of
fictionality resolves the delicate mathematical problem posed by this
substitution.
Two scientific generations earlier, Leibniz described infinitesimals as
“useful fictions,” yet he did not think that just because infinitesimals
are “fictions” one is allowed to set them equal to zero at will.
Ferraro further claimed that “The use of fictions made Eulerian
mathematics extremely different from modern mathematics” in his text
[Ferraro 2007, p. 64]. The plausibility of the claim depends on equivo-
cation on procedure/ontology as discussed in Section 2.4. The fact that
what Ferraro has in mind here is ontology is made clear on the previ-
ous page where he writes: “The rules that Euler uses upon [sic] infinite
and infinitesimal quantities constitute an immediate extrapolation of
the behaviour of a finite variable i tending to ∞ or 0”, [Ferraro 2007,
p. 63] and adds: “what is wholly missing is the complex construction
of ∗R and the assumptions upon which it is based.” (ibid.) (emphasis
added) But this ontological complaint is utterly irrelevant to procedure.
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The infinitesimals in Leibniz and Euler may have been fictions. How-
ever, they were not fictive or purely rhetorical, as Ferraro appears to
imply. Rather, they pose subtle issues of interpretation that are not
resolved by an appeal to “formal equality involving fictitious entities;”
see further in Section 4.12.
On occasion, Euler specifically wrote that his infinitesimals are un-
equal to zero: “Let ω be a number infinitely small, or a fraction so
tiny that it is just not equal to zero (tantum non nihilo sit aequalis)”
[Euler 1988, § 114]. This passage refers specifically to the infinitesi-
mal ω in formula (3.1) used in the derivation of the power series of
the exponential function (see Section 3.1 on the exponential function),
showing that error estimates are indeed required even if one takes Euler
literally.
4.9. Finite, infinite, and hyperfinite sums. Euler’s use of infinite
integers and their associated infinite products (such as the product de-
composition of the sine function) were interpreted in Robinson’s frame-
work in terms of hyperfinite expressions. Thus, Euler’s product of i-
infinitely many factors in (3.10) is interpreted as a hyperfinite product
in [Kanovei & Reeken 2004, formula (9), p. 74]. A hyperfinite formali-
sation of Euler’s argument involving infinite integers and their associ-
ated products illustrates the successful formalisation of the arguments
(and not merely the results) of classical infinitesimal mathematics.
In a footnote on 18th century notation, Ferraro presents a novel
claim that “for 18th-century mathematicians, there was no difference
between finite and infinite sums” [Ferraro 1998, footnote 8, p. 294]. Far
from being a side comment, the claim is emphasized a decade later in
the Preface to his book: “a distinction between finite and infinite sums
was lacking, and this gave rise to formal procedures consisting of the
infinite extension of finite procedures” [Ferraro 2008, p. viii]. The clue
to decoding Ferraro’s claim is found in the same footnote, where Ferraro
distinguishes between sums featuring a final term after the ellipsis, such
as
a1 + a2 + . . .+ an, (4.6)
and “infinite sums” without such a final term, as in
a1 + a2 + . . .+ an + . . . (4.7)
Note that A-track syntax is unable to account for terminating infinite
expressions which routinely occur in Euler. To be sure, Euler does not
use his infinite i as a final index in infinite sums of type a1 + . . . + ai
common in modern infinitesimal frameworks. However, his binomial
expansions with exponent i play the same role as the modern infinite
38 J.B., P.B., R.E., V.H., V.K., K.K., M.K., S.K., T.M., P.R, D.S., D.S., AND S.S.
sums a1 + . . . + ai. The final term ai is hinted upon by means of
Euler’s notation “&c.” but does not appear explicitly. Nonetheless,
procedurally speaking his infinite sums play the same role as the mod-
ern a1 + . . .+ ai.
From an A-track viewpoint, a terminating sum (4.6) is necessarily
a finite one, whereas only expressions of the form (4.7) ending with
an ellispis allow for a possibility of an “infinite sum.” No other op-
tion is available in the A-track; yet Euler appears recklessly to write
down infinite terminating expressions, as in the proof of the product
formula for sine (see Section 3.6 for a discussion of terminal summands
in infinite sums in Euler).
Meanwhile, the B-track approach allows one to account both for
Euler’s infinite integer i and for terminating expressions containing i
terms (see Appendix A for an instance of Euler’s use of polynomials of
infinite degree). Euler discusses the difference between finite and infi-
nite sums in Introductio [Euler 1748, § 59]. Terminating infinite sums
are easily formalized in Robinson’s framework in terms of hyperfinite
expressions (see Appendix A).
In a subsequent article, Ferraro and Panza write: “Power series
were conceived of as quasi-polynomial entities (that is, mere infinitary
extensions of polynomials)” [Ferraro & Panza 2003, p. 20]) (emphasis
added), but don’t mention the fact that such an extension can be for-
malized in terms of hyperfinite expressions, perhaps out of concern that
this may be deemed “alien” or “extraneous” to Euler.
Euler’s formula aiω = (1 + kω)i is analyzed in [Ferraro 2004, p. 48]
(a similar analysis appears in [Ferraro 2012, p. 9] in a section entitled
“Non-standard analysis and Eulerian infinitesimals”). Ferraro refor-
mulates Euler’s formula in terms of modern Sigma notation as follows:
aiω = (1 + kω)i =
∞∑
r=0
(
i
r
)
(kω)r.
The formula
ax =
∞∑
r=0
1
r!
(kx)r (4.8)
appears in [Ferraro 2004, Formula (2), p. 48] and is attributed to Euler.
The Sigma notation
∑∞
r=0 appears several times in Ferraro’s analysis
and is clearly not a misprint; it appears again in [Ferraro 2007, p. 48,
54]. Similarly, Ferraro exploits the modern notation
∑∞
i=1 ai for the
sum of the series, in [Ferraro 2008, p. 5], while discussing late 16th (!)
century texts of Vie`te. The Sigma notation (4.8) is familiar modern
notation for infinite sums defined via the modern concept of limit in a
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Weierstrassian context. Note that formula (4.8) attributed by Ferraro
to Euler involves assigning a sum to the series, namely ax, and therefore
is not merely a formal power series. The summation of an infinite series
via the concept of limit (namely, limit of the sequence of partial sums)
is not accessory but rather a sine qua non aspect of such summation
(alternatively, one could take the standard part of a hyperfinite sum,
but such an approach is apparently not pursued by Ferraro). The
symbol∞ appears in (4.8) as a kind of subjunctive. It has no meaning
other than a reminder that a limit was taken in the definition of the
series. In modern notation, the symbol∞ does not stand for an infinite
integer (contrary to the original use of this symbol by Wallis).
Thus, Ferraro reformulates Euler’s calculation using the Sigma no-
tation for infinite sum, including the modern somewhat subjunctive
use of the superscript ∞. However, such a procedure is extraneous
to Euler’s mathematics, since Euler specifically denotes the (infinite)
power by i. Applying the binomial formula with exponent i, one would
obtain, not Ferraro’s (4.8), but rather a sum from 0 to i, namely
i∑
r=0
(
i
r
)
(kx)r. (4.9)
Euler’s derivation of the exponential series is analyzed in more detail
in Section 4.4. Infinite sums of type (4.9) are perfectly meaningful
when interpreted in Robinson’s framework (see Appendix A). Ferraro’s
anachronistic rewriting of Euler’s formula betrays a lack of sensitivity
to the actual mathematical content of Euler’s work.
4.10. Bos–Ferraro differences. In this section we compare Ferraro’s
take on Euler with the approaches by other scholars, more compatible
with our reading of Euler. We will first compare the approaches of Bos
and Ferraro to Euler scholarship, and then those of Ferraro and Laug-
witz. Bos summarized Euler’s preliminary discussion of infinitesimals
in the following terms:
Euler claimed that infinitely small quantities are equal
to zero, but that two quantities, both equal to zero,
can have a determined ratio. This ratio of zeros was the
real subject-matter of the differential calculus [Bos 1974,
p. 66].
Bos goes on to note that Euler’s preliminary discussion is at variance
with Euler’s actual mathematical practices even in the Institutiones
(and not merely in the Introductio as discussed in Section 3.6), where
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the properties of the infinitely small are similar to those of finite dif-
ferences:
After having treated, in the first two chapters, the the-
ory of finite difference sequences, he defined the differen-
tial calculus as the calculus of infinitesimal differences:
The analysis of infinites, with which I am deal-
ing now, will be nothing else than a special case
of the method of differences expounded in the
first chapter, which occurs, when the differ-
ences, which previously were supposed finite,
are taken infinitely small [Euler 1755, §114],
which is rather at variance with his remarks quoted
above, a contradiction which shows that his arguments
about the infinitely small did not really influence his
presentation of the calculus [Bos 1974, pp. 67–68] (em-
phasis added)
Before analyzing Ferraro’s reaction to this position, we note that Bos’
focus on Euler’s “presentation of the calculus” indicates a concern for
methodological issues related to the nature of Euler’s procedures, rather
than focusing on the ontological nature of the objects (the infinitely
small) that Euler utilizes, in line with the distinction between procedure
and ontology that we explored in Section 2.4.
Ferraro disagrees with Bos’ perception of a “contradiction” in Euler’s
writing:
According to Bos, there is “a contradiction which shows
that his arguments about the infinitely small did not
really influence his presentation of calculus” [Bos, 1974,
68-69]. However, I would argue that one may see a con-
tradiction in the Institutiones only if, in contrast to Eu-
ler, [1] one distinguishes between limits and infinites-
imals and [2] neglects the nature of evanescent quan-
tities as fictions, [3] the role of formal manipulations
and [4] the absence of a separation between semantics
and syntax in the Eulerian calculus [Ferraro 2004, p. 54]
(emphasis and numerals [1], [2], [3], [4] added).
Ferraro appears to suggest that Bos’ position is problematic with regard
to the four items enumerated above. We will not analyze all four, but
note merely that in his item
[1] “one distinguishes between limits and infinitesimals”, (4.10)
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Ferraro commits himself explicitly to the position that “distinguish[ing]
between limits and infinitesimals,” as Bos does, is an inappropriate ap-
proach to interpreting Euler. Rather, Ferraro sees a conceptual conti-
nuity between limits and infinitesimals in Euler, or more precisely what
he refers to as a “continuous leap” (see Section 4.11).
We argue that Bos’s position on this aspect of Euler’s oeuvre is more
convincing than Ferraro’s. Note that Euler’s insistence on the similar-
ity of the properties of the finite and infinitesimal differences, in the
passage cited by Bos, is consonant with a Leibnizian law of continuity,
which requires two types of quantities to be compared: assignable and
inassignable (e.g., infinitesimal); see Section 3.3.
4.11. Was Euler ambiguous or confused? Ferraro postulated a
conceptual continuity between limits and infinitesimals in Euler’s work,
as expressed in Ferraro’s comment (4.10) meant to be critical of Bos’
position.
Ferraro’s criticism of Bos’ approach emanates from Ferraro’s ten-
dency to blur the distinction between A-track and B-track approaches.
A further attempt to blur this distinction is found in Ferraro’s “con-
tinuous leap” comment:
Eulerian infinitesimals . . . when interpreted using the
conceptual instruments available to modern mathemat-
ics, seem to be an ambiguous mixture of different ele-
ments, a continuous leap from a vague idea of limit to
a confused notion of infinitesimal” [Ferraro 2004, p. 59]
(emphasis added)
Ferraro’s comment appears in the “Conclusion” section in 2004. A
virtually identical comment appears in the abstract in 2012, and yet
again in the “Conclusion” section in [Ferraro 2012, p. 24].
We argue however that Euler was far less “ambiguous” or “confused”
than is often thought. Ferraro claims that when we allow our inter-
pretation of Euler to be informed by modern mathematical concepts,
we have no choice but to see Euler as fluidly moving from vague limits
to confused infinitesimals. Let us now compare the interpretations by
Ferraro and Laugwitz.
Ferraro’s opposition to Laugwitz’s interpretation is based on a confla-
tion of ontology and practice (see Section 2.4). Laugwitz is not trying
to read ontological foundations based on modern theories into Euler
(which would indeed be “alien” to Euler’s notions, to borrow Ferraro’s
terminology), but is rather focusing on Euler’s mathematical practice.
Furthermore, Ferraro’s own reading, with its emphasis on alleged
continuity between limits and infinitesimals, is not sufficiently sensitive
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to the distinction between dual approaches (as analyzed by both Klein
and Bos), which we refer to as A-track and B-track approaches.
Laugwitz’s interpretation showed that drawing upon modern con-
cepts allows us to see Euler’s reasoning as clear and incisive. Indeed,
we know since [Robinson 1961] that Felix Klein’s hunch concerning the
dual approaches to the foundations of analysis in [Klein 1908, p. 214]
was right on target (see Section 4.3). In short, Ferraro assimilates two
distinct approaches to the problem of the continuum without historical
or mathematical evidence.
4.12. Rhetoric and modern interpretations. In his 2004 article
[Ferraro 2004, p. 51, footnote 46] Ferraro sought to enlist the support of
[Bos 1974, Appendix 2] for his (Ferraro’s) opposition to interpretating
Euler in terms of modern theories of infinitesimals. However, Henk Bos
himself has recently distanced himself from the said Appendix 2 (part
of his Doctoral thesis) in a letter sent in response to a question from
one of the authors of the present text:
An interesting question, what made me reject a claim
some 35 years ago? I reread the appendix and was sur-
prised about the self assurance of my younger self. I’m
less definite in my opinions today – or so I think. You’re
right that the appendix was not sympathetic to Robin-
son’s view. Am I now more sympathetic? If you talk
about “historical continuity” I have little problem to
agree with you, given the fact that one can interpret
continuity in historical devlopments in many ways; even
revolutions can come to be seen as continuous develop-
ments [Bos 2010].
The letter is reproduced with the author’s permission. The shortcom-
ings of Bos’s Appendix 2 are analyzed in detail in [Katz & Sherry 2013,
Section 11.3] and in Section 2.7 here. The clarification provided by Bos
in 2010 weakens the claim of Bos’s support for Ferraro’s position on
Robinson. Ferraro claims that
[Laugwitz and other] commentators use notions such as
set, real numbers, continuum as a set of numbers or
points, functions as pointwise relations between num-
bers, axiomatic method, which are modern, not Eulerian
[Ferraro 2004, p. 51].
Certainly, sets, real numbers, the punctiform continuum, and the mod-
ern notion of function are not Eulerian concepts. But has Laugwitz
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really committed the misdemeanors attributed to him by Ferraro? Fer-
raro does not provide any evidence for his claim, and one searches in
vain the two articles [Laugwitz 1989] and [Laugwitz 1992b] cited by
Ferraro for clues of such misdemeanors. On the contrary, Laugwitz
warns the reader: “But one should have in mind that such concepts did
not appear before set theory was established” [Laugwitz 1989, p. 242];
and again:
Modern mathematicians should find of interest the fact
that he [Cauchy] succeeded by using only very few con-
cepts of an intensional quality, whereas we have become
accustomed to using a great many extensional concepts
based on set theory (ibid.).
Laugwitz is clearly aware of the point that modern set theory is alien
to Euler’s ontology. However, as discussed in Section 2.4, Laugwitz
is concerned with Euler’s procedures rather than his ontology. Fer-
raro has surely committed a strawman fallacy in describing Laugwitz’s
scholarship as being “alien” to Euler.
To be sure, rhetorical and formal aspects of historical mathematics
can be fruitfully studied in their own right. Yet an overemphasis on
the rhetorical aspect to a point of dismissing as “extraneous” scholarly
work that chooses to focus on the Eulerian mathematics per se, is
untenable.
One may well wonder whether it sheds more light on Euler to observe,
as Laugwitz does, that Euler’s infinitesimal procedures (Reeder’s infer-
ential moves) turn out to depend on hidden lemmas (such as those con-
cerning estimates for infinite sums of infinitesimals) but are otherwise
remarkably robust and formalizable in modern infinitesimal mathemat-
ics; or whether it sheds more light to assert nonchalantly, as Ferraro
does, that Euler considered infinitesimals to be exactly zero as a kind
of rhetorical device, and that therefore there are neither “gaps” nor
“hidden lemmas” in his proofs. Relating to Euler’s substitution
i− 1
i
= 1
as a rhetorical device as Ferraro does fails to explain why Euler some-
times disallows this type of substitution, as when Euler explains that
1 +
x
i
cannot be replaced by 1 in factors of an infinite product in the passage
from [Euler 1748, § 156] cited in Section 3.6. This passage from Euler
explicitly contradicts Ferraro’s rhetorical reading.
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4.13. Euler vs Berkeley, H. M. Edwards, and Gray. Cleric Berke-
ley’s critique tends to receive exaggerated attention in the literature.
We second Fraser’s assessment to the effect that “Berkeley’s critique
seems to have limited intrinsic merit” [Fraser 1999, p. 453, note 3]. We
now examine Ferraro’s approach to this critique. Ferraro states that
a [sic] unproblematic translation of certain chapters in
the history of mathematics into modern terms tacitly
assumes that the same logical and conceptual framework
guiding work in modern mathematics also guided work
in past mathematics [Ferraro 2012, p. 2].
Here Ferraro expresses a legitimate concern. Certainly one shouldn’t
project the conceptual framework guiding modern mathematics, upon
an 18th century text. However, in the very next paragraph, Ferraro
proceeds to state: “[Berkeley] did not cast any doubt upon the useful-
ness of the calculus in solving many problems of physics or geometry;
nevertheless, he believed that it did not possess solid foundations”
(ibid.) (emphasis added). Let us now examine the said foundations.
Berkeley’s “foundations,” if any are to be found, amount to an em-
piricist postulation of a minimal perceptual magnitude below which
one cannot descend, and a consequent rejection of an infinitely divisi-
ble “extension” (i.e., continuum). This is clearly not the sense of the
term mathematical foundations that Ferraro has in mind. Rather than
being concerned with the latter, Berkeley voiced two separate criti-
cisms: a metaphysical and a logical one; see [Sherry 1987]. The logical
criticism concerns the alleged inconsistency expressed by the conjunc-
tion (dx 6= 0) ∧ (dx = 0); see Section 3.3. The metaphysical criticism
is fueled by Berkeley’s empiricist doubts about entities that are below
any finite perceptual threshold.
Ferraro’s description of Berkeley’s criticism in terms of “foundations”
falls prey to the very shortcoming he seeks to criticize, namely grafting
modern concepts upon ones exploited in historical mathematics.
A related attempt by H. M. Edwards to sweep Euler’s infinitesi-
mals under an Archimedean rug in [Edwards 2007] was analyzed in
[Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015]. Edwards recently attempted to defend
his comment that Euler’s infinitesimal computations
will not find a receptive audience today, when students
are taught to shrink from differentials as from an in-
fectious disease [Edwards 2007, p. 579], [Edwards 2015,
p. 52] (emphasis added)
against our criticism in [Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015]. In recent years
it has become popular to interpret differentials as 1-forms. This is fine,
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but it is not Euler’s view, as we show in [Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015]
and in the present work. In his response to that article, Edwards
clarifies that he does not dismiss Euler’s use of differentials the way
many others do. But it is not Edwards’ disposition toward differentials
that is the problem, but rather his interpretation of Euler’s differentials.
In his response, Edwards again fails to acknowledge that Euler’s use of
bona fide infinitesimals is not reducible to a purely algebraic algorithm.
Instead, Edwards indulges in rhetorical non-sequiturs against Robin-
son’s framework, accusing it of being “far stranger than anything Eu-
ler could have imagined.” Edwards further accuses the authors of
[Kanovei, Katz & Sherry 2015] of “entertain[ing] strange ideas about
the concept of the infinite” (emphasis added). However, Edwards’ re-
marks amount to a baseless ad hominem attack, since the article in
question said not a word about either Robinson or his framework, fo-
cusing instead on the shortcomings of Edwards’ take on Euler’s work,
including a forced constructivist paraphrase thereof and an anachro-
nistic misattribution of the notion of derivative to Euler.
The book [Edwards, C. H., Jr. 1979] (unrelated) presents a sympa-
thetic view of Robinson’s framework, as does the book [Tao 2014] which
presents ultraproducts as a bridge between discrete and continous anal-
ysis.
A year after the publication of H. Edwards’ misguided analysis of
Euler in [Edwards 2007], J. Gray claimed that “Euler’s attempts at
explaining the foundations of calculus in terms of differentials, which
are and are not zero, are dreadfully weak.” [Gray 2008b, p. 6] (emphasis
added) Prisoner of A-track methodology, Gray does not fail to succumb
to Weierstrass’s ghost when he claims in his Plato’s ghost that Cauchy
“defined what it is for a function . . . to be continuous . . . using careful, if
not altogether unambiguous, limiting arguments.” [Gray 2008a, p. 62]
(emphasis added)
Pace Gray, it is inaccurate to claim that Cauchy defined continu-
ity using limiting arguments. The word limit does appear in Cauchy’s
infinitesimal definition of continuity (reproduced only two pages later
in Plato’s ghost): “the function f(x) is continuous with respect to x
between the given limits if, between these limits, an infinitely small in-
crement in the variable always produces an infinitely small increment in
the function itself.” [Bradley & Sandifer 2009, p. 26] Evidently, limits
do appear in Cauchy’s definition (though they are replaced by bounds
in [Gray 2008a, p. 64]). However, they appear only in the sense of the
endpoints of the interval, rather than any sense related to the Weier-
strassian notion of the limit.
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Gray’s grafting of Weierstrassian limits upon Cauchy’s definition of
continuity comes at a high price in anachronism. For a recent study of
Cauchy based on Robinson’s framework see [Ciesielski & Miller 2016].
Ferraro could have used another term in place of foundations ; how-
ever, the exaggerated significance attached to Berkeley’s allegedly foun-
dational critique becomes apparent when Ferraro declares that
The crux of the question lay in knowing what meaning
to attribute to the equation a + dx = a. The exactness
of mathematics required, according to Euler, that the
differential dx should be precisely equal to 0: simply
by assuming that dx = 0, the outrageous attacks on the
calculus would be shown to lack any basis [Ferraro 2012,
p. 3] (emphasis added).
Is this really the “crux of the question” as Ferraro contends? As dis-
cussed in Section 4.4, the exact zero infinitesimals are untenable and
lead to insoluble paradoxes. Meanwhile, the answer to Berkeley’s log-
ical criticism lies elsewhere, namely the generalized notion of equal-
ity implied by both the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity
and the Eulerian geometric comparison (see Section 3.4) dubbed the
principle of cancellation by Ferraro. Characterizing Berkeley’s logical
criticism as the “crux of the question” exaggerates the significance of
his flawed empiricist critique of infinitesimals.
4.14. Aristotelian continuum? Euler defined quantity as that which
could be increased or reduced in his Elements of Algebra: “Whatever
is capable of increase or diminution, is called magnitude, or quantity
[Euler 1810].”
This may have been a common definition in Euler’s time, but it
was not the classical definition of quantity. What is called today the
Archimedean axiom characterizes the ancient Greek notion of quantity,
but it does not appear in modern mathematics until 1885 when it was
rediscovered in [Stolz 1885]. Ferraro claims that
(1) Euler did not have the mathematical concept of set,
nor the theory of real numbers nor the modern notion of
function. (2) He based the calculus on the classic notion
of quantity. (3) Quantity was conceived of as that which
could be increased or reduced [Ferraro 2012] (emphasis
and numerals added).
Ferraro’s first and last claims are beyond dispute, but his intermedi-
ate claim (italicized above) is dubious. Namely, the claim that Euler’s
notion of quantity was a “classic” one is unsupported by evidence.
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Ferraro seeks to connect Euler’s quantity to the notion of quantity
of unspecified ancient Greeks as well as to the classical Aristotelian
conception: “[T]he Eulerian continuum is a slightly modified version
of the Leibnizian continuum, as described by Breger [1992a, 76–84],
which, in turn, has many aspects in common with the classical Aris-
totelian conception.” [Ferraro 2004, p. 37] Here Ferraro is referring to
[Breger 1992]. Breger does write on page 76 that “Leibniz reprend la
the´orie aristote´licienne du continu” but in the same sentence he contin-
ues: “en y apportant trois modifications.” One of these modifications,
according to Breger, is “l’emploi des grandeurs infinite´simales.” Fer-
raro’s claim that Breger’s description of the Leibnizian continuum has
“many aspects in common” with the Aristotelian one appears to mis-
represent Breger’s position as far as infinitesimals are concerned.
Thus, while the Archimedean axiom belongs to the classical and
modern notions of magnitude, it is found neither in Euler’s characteri-
sation of quantity as cited above, nor in Leibniz’s view of quantity. See
Sections 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 for a discussion of quantity from Euclid to
Euler.
5. Conclusion
In his essay for the collection Euler reconsidered, Ferraro writes: “Eu-
ler’s tripartite division of analysis was also the manifestation of his aim
to reduce analysis as far as possible to algebraic notions; this latter term
is used here to refer to notions deriving from an infinitary extension
of the principles of analysis of finite quantities” [Ferraro 2007, p. 45]
(emphasis added).
5.1. Cantor’s ghost. Ferraro’s reference to Euler’s infinitary exten-
sion of the principles of analysis of finite quantities alludes to concepts
such as infinite numbers and the associated infinite sums, or series, and
infinite products. Infinite series and products are familiar syntactic fea-
tures of modern, A-track, analysis as formalized by Cantor, Dedekind,
and Weierstrass starting in the 1870s. We would like to comment on
syntactic features that are noticeably absent from the said analysis.
Cantor’s own position can be briefly summarized as follows:
Infinity, yes.
Infinitesimals, no.
In more detail, J. Dauben wrote:
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Cantor devoted some of his most vituperative corre-
spondence, as well as a portion of the Beitra¨ge, to at-
tacking what he described at one point as the ‘infin-
itesimal Cholera bacillus of mathematics’, which had
spread from Germany through the work of Thomae, du
Bois Reymond and Stolz, to infect Italian mathematics
[Dauben 1980, pp. 216-217].
Dauben continues:
Any acceptance of infinitesimals necessarily meant that
his own theory of number was incomplete. Thus to ac-
cept the work of Thomae, du Bois-Reymond, Stolz and
Veronese was to deny the perfection of Cantor’s own
creation. Understandably, Cantor launched a thorough
campaign to discredit Veronese’s work in every way pos-
sible (ibid.)
Ferraro elaborates on his infinitary comment cited above as follows:
“Euler was not entirely successful in achieving his aim, since he intro-
duced infinitesimal considerations in various proofs ; however, algebraic
analysis, as a particular field of mathematics, was clearly set out in
the Introductio.” [Ferraro 2007, p. 45] (emphasis added). Given Fer-
raro’s acknowledgment that Euler exploits an infinitary extension of
the principles of analysis of finite quantities as cited above, one might
have expected that such an infinitary extension involves both infinite
numbers and infinitesimals.
Yes Ferraro appears to feel, apparently following Cantor, that in-
finite series constitute legitimate and successful infinitary extensions,
whereas inferences involving infinitesimals do not. However, infinite
numbers i and infinitesimals ω in Euler are related by the simple equa-
tion
ω =
1
i
or more generally iω = k where k is finite. Why would one be suc-
cessful and the other not entirely successful? A possible source of the
distinction is the reliance on a conceptual framework where infinite
series admit suitable A-track proxies, whereas infinitesimals do not.
Ferraro continues: “At the end of the eighteenth century, Euler’s plan
to undertake an algebraic treatment of the broadest possible part of
analysis of infinity had far-reaching consequences when Lagrange tried
to reduce the whole of calculus to algebraic notions. . . ” [Ferraro 2007,
p. 45]. Such a broadest possible algebraic framework is apparently not
broad enough, in Ferraro’s view, to encompass Eulerian infinitesimals.
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5.2. Primary point of reference? In a similar vein, Fraser claims
that
. . . classical analysis developed out of the older subject
and it remains a primary point of reference for under-
standing the eighteenth-century theories. By contrast,
nonstandard analysis and other non-Archimedean ver-
sions of calculus emerged only fairly recently in some-
what abstruse mathematical settings that bear little con-
nection to the historical developments one and a half,
two or three centuries earlier. [Fraser 2015, p. 27] (em-
phasis added)
For all his attempts to distance himself from Boyer’s idolisation of
the triumvirate,12 Fraser here commits himself to a position similar
to Boyer’s. Namely, Fraser claims that modern punctiform A-track
analysis is a primary point of reference for understanding the analysis
of the past. His sentiment that modern punctiform B-track analysis
bears little connection to the historical developments reveals insufficient
attention to the procedure/ontology dichotomy. A sentiment of the
inevitability of classical analysis is explicitly expressed by Fraser who
feels that “classical analysis developed out of the older subject and it
remains a primary point of reference for understanding the eighteenth-
century theories” yet his very formulation involves circular reasoning.
It is only if one takes classical analysis as a primary point of reference
that it becomes plausible to conclude that it inevitably developed out
of the older subject.
Such a position amounts to an unconditional adoption of the teleo-
logical butterfly model for the evolution of analysis, where infinitesimals
are seen as an evolutionary dead-end. Elaborating an application of
his butterfly/Latin dichotomy (see Section 2.6) to the case of infinites-
imals, Ian Hacking writes:
If analysis had stuck to infinitesimals in the face of philo-
sophical nay-sayers like Bishop Berkeley, analysis might
have looked very different. Problems that were pressing
late in the nineteenth century, and which moved Cantor
and his colleagues, might have received a different em-
phasis, if any at all. This alternative mathematics might
have seemed just as ‘successful’, just as ‘rich’, to its in-
ventors as ours does to us. In that light, as Mancosu
12Historian Carl Boyer described Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass as the great
triumvirate in [Boyer 1949, p. 298]; the term serves as a humorous characterisation
of both A-track scholars and their objects of adulation.
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argued, transfinite set theory now looks much more like
the result of one of Zeilberger’s random walks than an
inevitable mathematical development. [Hacking 2014,
p. 119]
5.3. Paradigm shift. Laugwitz’s pioneering articles from the 1980s
such as [Laugwitz 1987a], [Laugwitz 1987b], and [Laugwitz 1989] built
upon earlier studies, particularly [Robinson 1966] and [Lakatos 1978].
This work ushered in a new era in Euler and Cauchy scholarship. It
became possible to dispense with, and go beyond, the worn cliche´s
about unrigorous infinitesimalists and their inconsistent manipulations
with mystical infinitesimals. In the case of Euler, it became possible
to formalize and interpret some of his finest achievements in a way
that sheds new light on the methods he used. This work points to a
coherence of his formerly disparaged procedures based on the principle
of cancellation, infinitesimals, and infinite numbers, and establishes a
historical continuity in the procedures of infinitesimalists from Leibniz
and Euler to Robinson.
Such a paradigm shift in Euler scholarship has encountered resistance
from Ferraro, Fraser, Gray and other historians, who often cling to
Procrustean (and often slavishly post-Weierstrassian) frameworks of
Euler interpretation. Thus, Gray finds Euler’s explanations “dreadfully
weak” but such a dismissive attitude toward Euler comes at a high price
in anachronism when applied to the 18th century. Failing to distinguish
clearly between procedural and ontological issues, these historians focus
on the latter and stress the obvious point that modern set theory is alien
to Euler’s ontology, thus falling back on strawman misrepresentions of
the new wave of scholarship. The new scholarship accepts the obvious
ontological point, and focuses rather on the methodological issues of the
compatibility of Euler’s inferential moves and their proxies provided by
procedures available in modern infinitesimal frameworks.
Seeing with what dexterity Leibniz and Euler operated on infinite
sums as if they were finite sums, a modern scholar is faced with a
stark choice. He can either declare that they didn’t know the differ-
ence between finite and infinite sums, or detect in their procedures a
unifying principle (explicit in the case of Leibniz, and more implicit in
the case of Euler) that, under suitable circumstances, allows one to op-
erate on infinite sums as on finite sums. The former option is followed
by Ferraro, and is arguably dictated by self-imposed limitations of an
A-track interpretive framework. The latter option is the pioneering
route of Robinson, Lakatos, Laugwitz, and others in interpreting the
infinitesimal mathematics of Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy.
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Appendix A. Analysis of Euler’s proof
In Section 3.5 we summarized Euler’s derivation of the product de-
composition for sine. The derivation of infinite product decomposi-
tions (3.9) and (3.10) as found in [Euler 1748, § 156] can be broken up
into seven steps as follows. Recall that Euler’s i is an infinite integer.
Step 1. Euler observes that
2 sinh x = ex − e−x =
(
1 +
x
i
)i
−
(
1− x
i
)i
, (A.1)
where i is an infinitely large natural number. To motivate the next
step, note that the expression xi − 1 = (x− 1)(1 + x+ x2 + . . .+ xi−1)
can be factored further as a product
∏i−1
k=0(x− ζk), where ζ = e2pi
√−1/i;
conjugate factors can then be combined to yield a decomposition into
real quadratic terms.
Step 2. Euler uses the fact that ai − bi is the product of the factors
a2 + b2 − 2ab cos 2kπ
i
, where 1 ≤ k < i
2
, (A.2)
together with the factor a−b and, if i is an even number, the factor a+b,
as well.
Step 3. Setting a = 1 + x
i
and b = 1 − x
i
in (A.1), Euler transforms
expression (A.2) into the form
2 + 2
x2
i2
− 2
(
1− x
2
i2
)
cos
2kπ
i
. (A.3)
Step 4. Euler then replaces (A.3) by the expression
4k2π2
i2
(
1 +
x2
k2π2
− x
2
i2
)
, (A.4)
justifying this step by means of the formula
cos
2kπ
i
= 1− 2k
2π2
i2
. (A.5)
Step 5. Next, Euler argues that the difference ex − e−x is divisible
by the expression
1 +
x2
k2π2
− x
2
i2
(A.6)
from (A.4), where “we omit the term x
2
i2
since even when multiplied
by i, it remains infinitely small” [Euler 1988].
Step 6. As there is still a factor of a − b = 2x/i, Euler obtains
the final equality (3.9), arguing that then “the resulting first term will
be x” (in order to conform to the Maclaurin series for sinh x).
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Step 7. Finally, formula (3.10) is obtained from (3.9) by means of
the substitution x 7→ √−1 x. 
Euler’s argument in favor of (3.9) and (3.10) was formalized in
terms of a proof in Robinson’s framework in [Luxemburg 1973]. How-
ever, Luxemburg’s formalisation deviates from Euler’s argument be-
ginning with steps 3 and 4, and thus circumvents the most prob-
lematic steps 5 and 6. A proof in Robinson’s framework, formaliz-
ing Euler’s argument step-by-step throughout, appeared in the article
[Kanovei 1988]; see also [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997] as well as the mono-
graph [Kanovei & Reeken 2004, Section 2.4a]. This formalisation inter-
prets problematic details of Euler’s argument on the basis of general
principles in Robinson’s framework, as well as general analytic facts
that were known in Euler’s time. Such principles and facts behind
some early proofs exploiting infinitesimals are sometimes referred to as
hidden lemmas in this context; see [Laugwitz 1987a], [Laugwitz 1989],
and [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997].
For instance, a hidden lemma behind Step 4 asserts, on the basis of
the evaluation of the remainder R of the Taylor expansion
cos
2kπ
i
= 1− 2k
2π2
i2
+R ,
that the quadratic polynomial Tk(x) = 2 + 2
x2
i2
− 2(1 − x2
i2
)
cos 2kpi
i
as
in (A.3) admits the representation
Tk(x) = Ck
(
Uk(x) + pk · x2
)
,
where Ck and pk do not depend on x while
Uk(x) = 1 +
x2
k2π2
− x
2
i2
,
and for any standard real x and any finite or infinitely large integer k ≤
i
2
the following holds:
(1) if k is finite then pk is infinitesimal, and
(2) there is a real γ such that |pk| < γ · k−2 for any infinitely
large k ≤ i
2
.
This allows one to infer that the effect of the transformation of step 4
on the product of factors (A.3) is infinitesimal. See [Kanovei 1988, § 4]
as well as equation (11) on page 75 in [Kanovei & Reeken 2004] for
additional details.
Some hidden lemmas of a different kind, related to basic principles
of nonstandard analysis, are discussed in [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997,
pp. 43ff.] (see below).
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What clearly stands out from Euler’s argument is his explicit use of
infinitesimal quantities such as (A.3) and (A.4), as well as the approx-
imate formula (A.5) which holds “up to” an infinitesimal of higher or-
der. Thus, Euler exploited bona fide infinitesimals, rather than merely
ratios thereof, in a routine fashion in some of his best work.
We now provide further technical details on a hyperreal interpre-
tation of Euler’s proof of the product formula for the sine function.
Our goal here is to indicate how Euler’s inferential moves find modern
proxies in a hyperreal framework.
We discuss the hidden lemmas related to basic principles of nonstan-
dard analysis following [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997, pp. 43ff.], where it
is argued that the Euler sine factorisation and similar constructions
are best understood in the context of the following hidden definition
in terms of modern nonstandard analysis. The following definition is
borrowed from [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997, p. 44].
Definition. A sum a1+ a2+ a3+ . . . is Euler-convergent
(E-convergent) if and only if
(i) ak is defined by an elementary function,
13
(ii) for all infinite14 J , the sum a1 + a2 + . . . + aJ is
finite, and
(iii) for all infinite pairs J < K, the sum aJ + aJ+1 +
. . .+ aK is infinitesimal.
Similarly, a product (1 + bl)(1 + b2)(1 + b3) . . . is Euler-
convergent if and only if (i) bk is defined by an elemen-
tary function, (ii) for all infinite J , the product (1 +
b1)(1 + b2) . . . (1 + bJ) is finite, and (iii) for all infinitely
large J < K, the product (1 + bJ)(1 + bJ+1) . . . (1 + bK)
differs infinitesimally from 1.
Next, McKinzie and Tuckey present a series of hidden lemmas im-
plicit in Euler’s argument. The first such hidden lemma asserts that if
the sums a1 + a2 + . . . and b1 + b2 + . . . are E-convergent and ak ≃ bk
(meaning that ak − bk is infinitesimal) for all finite k, then
a1 + a2 + . . .+ aN ≃ b1 + b2 + . . .+ bN
for all N finite and infinite. To prove this lemma, it suffices to note
that if ak ≃ bk holds for all finite k, then, by Robinson’s lemma (see
13The precise meaning of the modern term elementary function is discussed in
[McKinzie & Tuckey 1997, p. 43, footnote 23].
14Here the terms finite and infinite correspond to limited and infinitely large in the
terminology of [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997].
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e. g., Theorem 2.2.12, p. 62 in [Kanovei & Reeken 2004]), there is an
infinite K such that a1 + · · ·+ ak ≃ b1 + . . .+ bk holds for all k ≤ K.
The second hidden lemma asserts a similar property for products.
The third hidden lemma asserts that if, for all finite x, the sums
f(x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + . . . and g(x) = b0 + b1x+ b2x
2 + . . .
are E-convergent and we have [f(x) ≃ g(x)]. This means that a0 +
a1x + a2x
2 + . . . + aJx
J ≃ b0 + b1x + b2x2 + . . . + bKxK for all infi-
nite J,K. Note that the choice of J,K is immaterial by (ii) and (iii)
of the definition of E-convergence. Then an ≃ bn for all n finite and
infinite. A detailed analysis in [McKinzie & Tuckey 1997] shows that
these three lemmas, together with an additional sublemma, suffice to
formalize Euler’s derivations step-by-step in a hyperreal framework.
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